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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1944-1945 *
I. BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
CORPORATIONS

C

ORPORATE by-laws must possess some foundation in reason
in order to be valid. It was upon this test that the Appellate
Court for the First District grounded its opinion in the case of
Electrical Contractors' Association v. A. S. Schulman Electric
Company 1 wherein it upheld an association by-law which fixed
the membership dues on a percentage basis of the amount of
business done by the particular member. 2 By-laws of that type
have been condemned in other jurisdictions, particularly as
applied to contractors bidding upon public works, for the reason
3
that the expense of membership would increase the public cost.
The court concluded, however, that the method of charging dues
was reasonable since the more active members would receive
* The present survey is not intended in any sense as a complete commentary
upon, or annotation of, the cases decided by the Illinois courts during the past
year, but is published rather for the purpose of calling attention merely to cases
and developments believed significant and interesting. The period covered is that
of the judicial year, embracing from 387 Ill. 1 to 390 Ill. 411; from 323 Il. App.
74 to 326 Ill. App. 515.
Statutory changes having general interest are also
included.
'324 Ill. App. 28, 57 N. E. (2d) 220 (1944). Leave to appeal has been granted
but as yet no decision has been reported by the Illinois Supreme Court.
2 The court also decided that a corporation for profit could be a member of
an incorporated non-profit association.
Although Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32,
§ 157.5, contemplates corporate participation in other enterprises, the language
thereof would seem to indicate that such grant is limited to participation in enterprises conducted for profit. The court, nevertheless, based its decision on this
point upon principles of convenience and necessity: 324 Ill. App. 28 at 33-4, 57
N. E. (2d) 220 at 223.
3 Kentucky Ass'n of Highway Contractors v. Williams, 213 Ky. 167, 280 S. W.
937, 45 A. L. R. 544 (1926); Constructors' Ass'n of Western Pennsylvania v.
Seeds, 142 Pa. Super. 59, 15 A. (2d) 467 (1940); Bailey v. Association of Master
Plumbers, 103 Tenn. 99, 52 S. W. 853 (1899); Associated Wisconsin Contractors
v. Lathers, 235 Wis. 14, 291 N. W. 770 (1940).
1
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more service than the less active ones, hence ought to pay on a
sliding scale, otherwise the cost of membership would be disproportionate to the benefits received. As the method utilized
is one that has been extensively adopted,4 the final outcome of the
case should be extremely significant.
The only other instances of judicial action possessing significance have bearing upon the business of banking. Contracts
made by banking corporations may be struck down on the ground
of ultra vires, 5 but that form of attack must fail, according to
Margolis v. Uptown National Bank of Chicago,6 if it in any way
appears that some substantial benefit redounds to the bank under
the contract. The bank there held a minor share of the beneficial
interests under a liquidation trust formed to salvage properties
acquired through foreclosure. Despite the fact that the bank had
only a minor interest, it was held proper for it to undertake to pay
all expenses involved in liquidating the properties on the ground
that it possessed an implied power to take all or any action
7
deemed necessary to protect the bank's interest.
While the constitutional liability of shareholders in a banking
corporation which has changed its name, increased its capital, or
undergone other internal change, remains the same,8 an entirely
different view applies to a banking corporation which has consolidated with another according to the ruling in Burnett v. Garfield State Bank.' In the latter situation, the shareholders of the
constituent banks making up the consolidated company are not
necessarily relieved of liability upon their original shares, 10 and
may also be held upon the shares they acquire in the consolidated
company. Because these liabilities are distinct, it was held that
4 The court noted that of 204 national and regional trade associations selected
at random, approximately 61% levy dues on a sliding scale: 324 Ill. App. 28 at
39-40, 57 N. E. (2d) 220 at 225.
5 Knass v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 354 Il1. 554, 188 N. E. 836 (1934).
6 323 Ill. App. 575, 56 N. E. (2d) 478 (1944).
7 An earlier abstract opinion in Dolan v. Morensky, 294 111. App. 615, 14 N. E.
(2d) 313 (1938), had reached the same result.
8 Holderman v. Moore State Bank, 383 Ill. 534, 50 N. E. (2d) 741 (1943) ; Heine
v. Degen, 362 Ill. 357, 199 N. E. 832 (1936).
9 324 Ill. App. 190, 58 N. E. (2d) 187 (1944). Leave to appeal has been denied.
10 Whether a novation has occurred is a question of fact: Burnett v. West
Madison State Bank, 375 Ill. 402 at 410-1, 31 N. E. (2d) 776 at 780 (1941).
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a judgment based on one of them does not operate as res adjudicata as to the other. The court at the same time indicated that
it would have been irregular to try out both liabilities in the
same suit." Although no Illinois court has, as yet, held that the
beneficiaries of a business trust which owns shares in a bank
may be subjected to the constitutional liability imposed for the
benefit of the bank's creditors, that point has been determined by
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the case
of Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Goldberg 12 where it
was held that the court might go behind the record shareholder
to reach the persons beneficially interested in the stock. An
exculpatory clause such as is usually found in trust agreements
creating business trusts was held to be ineffective to clothe the
beneficiary with immunity from liability.
A decision which should go far toward accelerating the disposition of pending cases growing out of the banking collapse of
the 1930's was handed down by the Illinois Supreme Court when
it passed upon the appeal in Decker v. Domoney.18 It there held
that a receiver appointed to collect judgments in a shareholders'
liability suit might, upon proper application and showing, sell any
uncollected judgments at public sale in order to complete liquidation. Although there is some doubt as to the legal basis for such
holding, 14 the practical results achieved are eminently desirable
for a continuation of such litigation is unlikely to yield any substantial benefit to the unpaid creditors.
Legislative activity during the recent session concerning the
statute law regulating corporations for profit was confined to the
passage of one bill, but that measure amends a number of sections
11 324 Ill. App. 190 at 207, 58 N. E. (2d) 187 at 193. Statements in Heine v.
Degen, 362 Ill. 357 at 375, 199 N. E. 832 at 840 (1936), to the effect that the bank
there concerned should not be treated as two banks, one before and one after
reorganization, were distinguished on the ground that only internal reorganization
was there involved.
12 143 F. (2d) 752 (1944), noted in 23 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 256.
13387 Ill. 524, 56 N. E. (2d) 750 (1944), noted in 23 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIaw 258. The Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, achieved a comparable
Major,
result in Wagner v. South Chicago Sav. Bank, 146 F. (2d) 686 (1945).
C. J., wrote a dissenting opinion. See note, 19 So. Cal. L. Rev. 57.
14 See comment thereon in 23 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 258, particularly pp.
260-1.
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of the Business Corporation Act. 15 Thus, language has been
deleted from Section 5(h) so as to permit the corporation to make
contracts and incur liabilities without the restriction heretofore
existing that the same should be "appropriate to enable it to
accomplish any or all of its purposes." 1 The section regulating
the defense of ultra vires has been recast and now extends to
corporate acts as well as to conveyances and transfers. 17 Demands
for payment of subscriptions must hereafter be in writing.' s
Service may be had on the Secretary of State whenever the
registered agent cannot, with reasonable diligence, be found. 19
2°
Paid in or other surplus may be transferred to stated capital.
Treasury shares, whether acquired by redemption or purchase,
may be cancelled. 2 1 The power to cancel shares of a wholly-owned
subsidiary appears to have been revoked. 22 A new section
regulates dividends in partial liquidation.2 3 False response to
interrogatories, as well as failure to respond, has been made a
ground for dissolution. 24 Either a certificate of dissolution or
a certified copy of the decree itself may be recorded upon completion of dissolution proceedings.2 5 Other minor changes in
26
terminology have been made to bring the act up to date.
A comparable statute has made substantially similar changes
in the law relating to corporations organized not for pecuniary
profit. 27 Detailed change has been made in the Building, Loan
and Homestead Association Act; 28 an entirely new law has been
enacted for the organization of medical service plan corpora15 Laws 1945, p. 544, et seq. H. B. 563.

16 Laws 1945, p. 544, H. B. 563; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.5(h). Compare with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32. § 157.5(h).
17 Laws 1945, p. 545, H. B. 563; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.8.
is Laws 1945, p. 546, H. B. 563; Il. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.16.
19 Laws 1945, p. 546, H. B. 563; Il. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.13.
2o Laws 1945, p. 547, H. B. 563;. I1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.19.
21 Laws 1945, p. 549, H. B. 563; Il1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.58a.
22 Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.58a with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943,
Ch. 32, § 157.58a.
23 Laws 1945, p. 548, H. B. 563; Il1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.41a.
24 Laws 1945, p. 550, H. B. 563; Il1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.82.
25 Laws 1945, p. 553, H. B. 563; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 157.92.
26 Laws 1945, p. 544, H. B. 563; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, §§ 157.38, 157.83,
157.84, 157.90, and 157.94.
27 Laws 1945, p. 586, H. B. 592; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, §§ 163a5, 163a9,
163a11, and 163a69.
28 Laws 1945, p. 560, H. B. 487; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 217 et seq.
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29

and substantial revision has occurred in the "Blue Sky"

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT

Some Appellate Court cases would seem worthy of mention
under this heading. The case of Molitor v. Chicago Title &
Trust Company 31 gives Illinois a clear decision sustaining the
doctrine of "permanent employment," with all its implications.
The court held that a promise of "permanent employment" as a
title examiner, in consideration of which plaintiff gave up the
beginnings of a New York law practice and moved his family to
Chicago, obligated the defendant to retain plaintiff in its employ
so long as it had work of the type specified and he was capable
of doing it. The court adopted the doctrine from the Massa32
chusetts leading case of Carnig v. Carr.
The case of Chicago Title & Trust Company v. Guild33 offers
what is believed to be a novel but proper use of interpleader,
i. e. a proceeding to interplead several real estate brokers each
claiming a commission arising from the same sale. The property
had been listed on a non-exclusive basis with several brokers.
The court held that the four essentials of an interpleader action 34
were present and sustained the proceeding.
Because of factual rather than strict legal interest, attention
35
is invited to the decision in Shannessy v. Walgreen Company,
in which the court reversed a judgment for plaintiff arising out
of a battery. The altercation occurred in the early morning
hours when plaintiff returned to defendant's store to adjust
29 Laws 1945. p. 578, S. B. 652; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 563 et seq.
30 Laws 1945, p. 1323, H. B. 676; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 121 , § 96 et seq.
•2-1
325 Il. App. 124, 59 N. E. (2d) 695 (1945).
32 167 Mass. 544, 46 N. E. 117 (1897).
33 323 I1. App. 608, 56 N. E. (2d) 659 (1944).
3
4 In Morrill v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 183 Ill. 260 at 267, 55 N. E. 656 at 659
(1899), the court stated such essentials as being, "First, the same thing, debt
or duty must be claimed by both or all the parties against whom the relief is
demanded; second, all the adverse titles, or claims must be dependent on or be
derived from a common source; third, the person asking the relief-the plaintiffmust not have or claim any interest in the subject matter; fourth, he must have
incurred no independent liability to either of the claimants,-that is, he must
stand perfectly indifferent between them, in the position, merely, of stake-holder."
35 324 II. App. 590, 59 N. E. (2d) 330 (1945).
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differences between himself and the store manager arising out
of the latter's charge that plaintiff had, on a prior occasion, stolen
merchandise. The accusation had been made by the manager
to plaintiff's companion, in plaintiff's absence, a few minutes
before the fracas occurred and had been accompanied by the
threat that if plaintiff "comes in here again I will hit him with
a baseball bat." It was the repetition of this charge by the
companion to the plaintiff which precipitated the latter's immediate return. Apparently, the store manager, after ordering plaintiff to depart and receiving the latter's refusal so to do, picked
up a bat and struck plaintiff three times, breaking his arm. The
court held that the battery was not committed within the scope of
the master-servant relationship, stressing the fact that the assault
was to avenge prior theft and that the manager was not "acting
within either the express or implied authority of his position."
The law is clear, of course, that liability of the master under
the doctrine of respondeat superior is not limited to acts which
6
are done with either express or implied authority.A
The sole
question would seem to be whether or not the servant was in the
course of his employment at the time of the injury. It would
seem particularly within the scope of employment of the night
manager of a drug store to discourage the presence of persons
believed undesirable. The remark made to plaintiff's companion
would seem to be of this character. The return of the plaintiff
to the store and the battery complained of may well be linked
so closely with the comment referred to as to constitute part of
the same transaction. Attention, however, is particularly invited
to the fact that the court not only reversed the judgment based
on the verdict but also ordered judgment entered for the
defendant.
LABOR

LAW

Suits against labor unions by their association names to
recover damages at law allegedly resulting from certain union
36 Mechem, Agency, 2d Ed., Vol. II, § 1855, states:
"It may be an act expressly
forbidden by the principal; it may have been an act which the principal feared and
specifically warned against ...
"
See also 39 C. J., Master and Servant, § 1487
and authorities there cited.
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activities have been unproductive for the Illinois courts have
adhered to the common-law rule that unincorporated associations are not suable at law in the manner used for other entities.
That rule has not been changed by statute. In Kingsley v.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters 7 the court distinguished suits
against fraternal benefit societies" as being specifically authorized by statute,3 9 and certain other cases as being either injunction suits in equity 40 or contempt proceedings growing out of
such suits. 41 In another case, that of Montgomery Ward &
Company, Inc. v. Franklin Union,42 the court, rejected the contention that Section 24 of the Civil Practice Act 43 authorized such
suits. The court held that the question was one of substance
going to the jurisdiction of the court and not one of procedure.
As long as trade unions remain unincorporated, there is little
likelihood of holding them financially responsible in the absence
of a special enabling statute.4 4
WORKMEN S

COMPENSATION

Two unusual cases dealing with workmen's compensation
5
arose during the year. In Hudson v. Industrial Commission 4
the applicant's deceased was, in his lifetime, employed to work
for Hudson and also for a bus company. The work for each
employer was of a different nature but the work required by
both was in operation at the same time. When the deceased left
to carry out his duties for his employers on the day his death
occurred, he was not only enroute to perform but was, in fact,
performing duties for both of them. The employer Hudson was
not only engaged in business of his own but was also manager
37 323 Il. App. 353, 55 N. E. (2d) 554 (1944).
38 Wade v. Grand Lodge Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 245 I1. App. 532
(1928) ; Wardlow v. Grand Lodge Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 245 Ill. App.
142 (1924).
39 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 73, § 894 et se.
40 Western-United Dairy Co. v. Nash, 293 Ill. App. 162, 12 N. E. (2d) 47 (1937);
Biller v. Egan, 290 Ill. App. 219, 8 N. E. (2d) 205 (1937).
41 Maywood Farms Co. v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago, 316 Ii. App. 47,
43 N. E. (2d) 700 (1942), noted in 22 CRIOAGo-KENT LAw REvmw 8.
42 323 Ill. App. 590, 56 N. E. (2d) 476 (1944).
Leave to appeal has been denied.
43 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 148.
44 Cases dealing with the Illinois Unemployment Compensation Act are dealt with
under the subject of Taxation. C.f., post.
45 387 Ill. 228, 56 N. E. (2d) 423 (1944).
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and principal stockholder in the bus corporation. The court held
that as the deceased person was a joint employee on a joint mission, the two employers were jointly liable to pay the award.
The court suggested that there are no Illinois cases in which the
46
facts are parallel but mentioned an Arizona case as precedent.
In the other case, that of Oran v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation,47 the Appellate Court arrived at an important decision
concerning the right of an illegally-employed minor, where both
employer and wrongdoer are under the act, to maintain a commonlaw action despite a failure to give statutory notice within six
months of rejection of benefits under the act. 48 It held that, in
view of the public policy of this state to protect the rights of
minors, 49 there could be no clear statutory limitation running
against the minor until a guardian had been appointed for him,
particularly since the minor was legally incapable of making the
rejection himself and was equally incapable of appointing an
agent or attorney to act in his behalf.
PARTNERSHIP AND ASSOCIATIONS

No case law of significance has been made on this subject, but
two changes made by the legislature are noteworthy. By one of
them, 50 the limitation in the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
which forbade a limited partnership from engaging in the brokerage business 51 has been repealed. Such concerns are still
denied the right to run banks, provide insurance or operate railroads.
In 1941, the legislature required that all persons using an
assumed business name were obliged to register the same, with
46 Butler v. Industrial Commission, 50 Ariz. 516, 73 P. (2d) 703 (1937).
47 324 Ill. App. 463, 58 N. E. (2d) 731 (1945), noted in 23 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvIEW 355. See also Angerstein, The Child Labor Act and The Workmen's Compensation Act of Illinois, 20 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REviEw 193 (1942),
pp. 202-5.
48 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 48, § 143.

particularly

49 Waechter v. Industrial Commission, 367 Ill. 256, 11 N. E. (2d) 379 (1937);
Walgreen Co. v. Industrial Commission, 323 Ill. 194, 153 N. E. 831, 48 A. L. R. 1199
(1926).
50 Laws 1945, p. 1090, H. B. 542; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 106%, § 46.
51 Il. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 106%, § 46.
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other pertinent information, in the office of the clerk of the county
court. 52 A new section has now been added thereto which permits any person who filed such a certificate to cancel the same, in
whole or in part, by filing a supplementary certificate under oath
showing that such person has ceased doing business under the
assumed name and no longer has any financial or other interest
53
therein.
II. CONTRACTS
In complete harmony with accepted principles of contract law,
but rather surprising to many lawyers as well as laymen, was
the decision in Groves v. Carolene Products Company.' The
defendant there, a manufacturer, offered a substantial prize to
the contestant who furnished the most complete list of words
constructed from the letters in the phrase "Milnot Whips." The
traditional warning that the "decision of the judges shall be
final" was a part of the offer. At the close of the contest, the
judges awarded the prize to some one who submitted a less complete list of words than did the plaintiff. He filed suit for the
prize and defendant countered with the contention that the
"decision of the judges" was controlling.
A scrutiny of the questions raised under the facts and by the
pleadings reveals that, in such a prize offer, the acceptance must
be determined by objective standards which in the instant case
would require a mere counting of the number of words submitted.
As there was little or no room for any exercise of discretion by
the judges of the contest, the provision in the offer that the
"decision of the judges shall be final" was treated as surplusage
and plaintiff's complaint was held to state a cause of action. It
should, nevertheless, be observed that in competitions where the
contest judges have been given room for discretion, i. e. contests
involving "most beautiful," "most musical," "most poetical,"
"funniest," etc., the decision of the judges is controlling in the
52

Laws 1941, Vol. I, p. 550; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 96, § 4 et seq.

53 Laws 1945, p. 1088, S. B. 273; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 96, § 6a.
1324 I1. App. 102, 57 N. E. (2d) 507 (1944), noted in 23 CHrcAGo-KET LAW

REvIIw 250, 39 Ill. L. Rev. 296.
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absence of provable fraud for the standard of measurement is
2
subjective.
NEGOTIABLE

INSTRUMENTS

The Appellate Court decision in Ruwisch v. Theis 3 holds
squarely that Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act'
eliminates the applicability to negotiable instruments of the
anachronistic doctrine of descriptio personae. This is, of course,
the general rule 5 and the case is thought worthy of mention here
primarily because of a somewhat different attitude displayed by
the court in the earlier decision of Kaspar American State Bank
v. Oul Homestead Association., Although in that case the court
recognized the general rule, it held such rule inapplicable because
the body of the note purported to bind the "undersigned jointly
and severally." The note in the present case employed, in the
body, the words "I, we, or either of us."
Although the same
contention was raised as in the earlier case, no reference was
made in the opinion to that decision.
In Naas v. Peters,7 the Illinois Supreme Court has reiterated
the principle that under Section 18 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act 8 an undisclosed principal is not liable on a negotiable instrument. The instrument there involved was secured by a purchase
money mortgage and, in foreclosure proceedings, a deficiency
decree had been entered against both principal and agent which
decree had been sustained in the Appellate Court. The Supreme
Court, when reversing, distinguished the situation before it from
2 See annotation in 67 A. L. R. 413 to Scott v. People's Monthly Company, 209
Iowa 503, 228 N. W. 263 (1929).
3 325 Ill. App. 307, 60 N. E.

(2d) 108 (1945).

4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 98, § 40, states: "Where the instrument contains, or a
person adds to his signature, words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of the
principal, or in a representative capacity, he is not liable on the instrument if he
was duly authorized ...."
5 See Britton, Handbook of the Law of Bills and Notes (West Pub. Co., St. Paul,
1943), § 164.
6301 Ill.App. 326, 22 N. E. (2d) 785 (1939), noted in 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 196, 28 Ill. B. J1.178.
7388 11. 505, 58 N. E. (2d) 530 (1944), noted in 40 Ill. L. Rev. 133, reversing 321
Ill. App. 212, 52 N. E. (2d) 817 (1944).
S Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 98, § 38, declares:

"No person Is liable on the instrument whose signature does not appear thereon, except as herein otherwise expressly
provided."
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the case of Bride v. Stormer 9 in which, under somewhat similar
circumstances, the undisclosed principal, a bank, was held liable
on the underlying indebtedness. The court recognized the force
of Section 18 in the earlier case, but seemed to predicate liability
there upon a theory of money had and received, coupled with a
10
resulting trust theory, rather than one of agency.
Attention is also invited to the Supreme Court decision in the
case of In re Feldman's Estate '" which involved the effect of a
"marginal" notation on the maturity of a promissory note. In
the body of the instrument the words "on or before" had been
written on the printed form and the printed word "after"
stricken, so that the undertaking was to pay "on or before date."
The note was dated March 1, 1931. The "marginal" notation
read "Due Mar. 1, 1939," the first word being printed and the
rest written in. The Appellate Court had held that the note was
payable on demand, but the Supreme Court reversed and gave
effect to the "marginal" notation to resolve the "ambiguity" in
the body of the instrument.
INSURANCE

The Illinois Supreme Court has set at rest the controversy
which existed between the first and third divisions of the First
District Appellate Court over the right of a beneficiary, after
death of the insured, to assign the benefits of an industrial life
insurance policy.1' 2 By its decision in the case of Lain v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,'8 the higher court now holds
that such policies are assignable even though they contain a provision which declares that "any assignment or pledge of this
policy or any part of its benefits shall be void." The presence of
a so-called "facility of payment" clause likewise does not pre524, 15 N. E. (2d) 282 (1938).
9368 Ill.
10 For a helpful, but critical, discussion of the distinction drawn in the later case,
reference is made to a note to Naas v. Peters in 40 Ill. L. Rev. 133.
11 Sub nom. Van Zele v. Smaltz, 387 111. 568, 56 N. E. (2d) 405 (1944), reversing
320 Il1. App. 243, 50 N. E. (2d) 766 (1943). Smith, C. J., and Murphy, J., dissented.
See also note in 23 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 12.

12 A discussion of the conflicting decisions is contained in 22 CHICAGo-KENT LAW

REVIEW 269.

13388 111. 576, 58 N. E. (2d) 587 (1945), reversing 322 Ill. App. 643, 54 N. E. (2d)
736 (1944).
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vent assignment by the named beneficiary, even though the company may have an election thereunder to pay either the named
beneficiary or one of a class of other persons if the named beneficiary fails to surrender the policy within thirty days, for such
clause does not prevent the beneficiary's rights from vesting.
Clauses of this character were deemed objectionable on the ground
of public policy. Subsequent to that holding, the Appellate Court,
in Standard Discount Company v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company,14 held that the election in the "facility of payment"
clause was ineffective against an assignment where it did not
appear that the insurance company had, in fact, exercised the
election by paying the proceeds of the policy to another. Language
in the Supreme Court opinion was quoted with satisfaction and
the intermediate tribunal emphasized the equity of that decision
in eliminating expensive probate proceedings.
Another case of first impression is to be found in Olympia
Fields Country Club v. Bankers Indemnity Insurance Company i5
wherein it was held that an insurer may be held liable for refusing to settle a case both before trial and also pending appeal for
an amount within the policy limits where the trial could, and did,
result in a judgment against the insured in excess of the policy.
Such holding was predicated on the grounds of fraud, negligence,
and bad faith. The basis of liability has been vigorously disputed
where negligence alone is the gist of the action, 6 but fraud and
bad faith seem to be more readily accepted as imputing liability
on the part of the insurer. The specific charge of bad faith in
that case was that the insurer arbitrarily and unreasonably
refused to compromise contrary to the advice of its attorney.
Unfortunately, the opinion is not yet decisive for the case was
remanded for a new trial. Upon such re-trial, 'a different conclusion on the law might be reached and, if the case reaches the
Illinois Supreme Court, that tribunal might prefer the viewpoint
17
obtaining in a majority of other states.
14 325 I1. App. 506, 60 N. E. (2d) 445 (1945).
Niemeyer. P. J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
15 325 Iln. App. 649, 60 N. E. (2d) 896 (1945).
16 See. for example, Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N. W.
257 (1930).
17 Best Bldg. Co. v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., 247 N. Y. 451, 160 N. E.
911, 71 A. L. R. 1464 (1928).
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Legislative change has occurred in the Insurance Code, but
the amendments are of a specialized nature and not of general
interest.'
QUASI-CONTRACTS

Recovery of payments made under a mistake of law has generally been denied upon the theory that no contract can be
implied, either in fact or law, to support an action for restitution. 19 Certainly, one who pays with full knowledge of the facts
but in ignorance of their legal significance cannot complain of
the consequences attached to his own neglect or mistaken assumption as to the law. When, however, he inadvertently overlooks
some fact bearing on his legal liability, it is a little harsh to say
that a payment so mistakenly made cannot be recovered. 20 Such
was the holding, though, in Western & Southern Life Insurance
Company v. Brueggeman 21 where an insurer was denied the right
to recover the proceeds of an insurance policy paid at a time when
it possessed information tending to show an absence of liability
although, through oversight, the effect thereof was not taken into
consideration because concentration was directed on another
known fact which might have affected liability. Although the
holding might be said to revolve on a question of waiver, the
court did use language indicating that there was no difference
in the rule when applied either to persons paying with full
knowledge of the facts or to those who had access to pertinent
information but had overlooked the same.
SALES

A statutory provision requires that an automobile dealer issue
22
a bill of sale to the purchaser upon the sale of a motor vehicle.
isLaws 1945, p. 957, S. B. 453; ibid., p. 964, S. B. 547; ibid., p. 966, H. B. 691;
and ibid., p. 950, H. B. 712. The revised text appears in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch.
73, §§ 737, 785, 937, 939, 1009 and 1010.
19 In Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East 469 at 472, 102 Eng. Rep. 448 at 449 (1802), Lord
Ellenborough, C. j., mistakenly believing that every man "must be taken to be
cognizant of the law," urged that such rule had to be applied or else there would
be no saying to what extent 'the excuse of ignorance might not be carried."
20 See Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 237 Ala. 474, 187 So. 462 (1939).
21 323 Ill. App. 173, 55 N. E.

(2d)

719 (1944),

REVIEW 275.
22 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 95j, § 18.

noted in

23 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
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Refusal to comply with such requirement was held sufficient, in
Fruehauf Trailer Company v. Lydick, 23 to support an action for
damages on the part of the purchaser even though the refusal
was predicated on the fact that an amount remained due for work
done on another automobile. It would seem, therefore, that a
general common-law lien could not attach to the buyer's right to
24
demand a bill of sale.
The operation of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act 25 was
involved in Commercial Credit Corporationv. Horan 26 where the
statute was declared to be effective to protect the rights of an
entruster who had complied with the filing requirements. 27 In
that case a judgment creditor had levied upon an automobile in
the possession of one Liebold, a licensed used car dealer, and
bearing Liebold's license plates, for money due from Liebold.
The plaintiff claimed under a trust receipt from one Pearson who
was operating as a used car dealer without license but using Liebold's premises and license. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed
when it appeared that all necessary steps to complete trust receipt
operation were present. The result could be deemed harsh no
matter what the outcome, but the decision effectuates the purpose
of the statute and perhaps it is better policy to require the levying creditor, or any purchaser out of the usual course of business,
to make full inquiry as to the question of possession.
Following the analogy that an absolute transfer with an option
to repurchase will generally be held to be a mortgage, 28 it was held
in Chapin v. Tampoorlos 29 that the documents constituting a conditional sale transaction can be made the subject of a pledge where
the purpose is one to secure the repayment of a debt. The absolute character of the purported sale thereof was regarded as
ineffective to constitute a true sale in view of the alleged seller's
App. 28, 59 N. E. (2d) 551 (1945). Leave to appeal has been denied.
Such bill of sale is necessary, under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 95 , § 77b, in
order that the buyer can obtain a certificate of title on the automobile.
25 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 121J, § 166 et seq.
26 325 Il. App. 625, 60 N. E. (2d) 763 (1945).
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 1211, §§ 172 and 178.
28 Behrendt v. Acocella, 320 Ili. 308, 150 N. E. 913 (1926).
29325 Il. App. 219, 59 N. E. (2d) 334 (1945).
23 325 Il.
24
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right to reacquire the pledged documents upon satisfaction of the
debt.
The only appreciable change in the law of sales made during
the recent session of the legislature was one which amplified the
list of exempted securities sold under the terms of the so-called
"Blue Sky" Law. 0 The amendment does not appear to have
31
disturbed the holding in Scully v. DeMet.
III. CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Scarcely a case reaches the appellate tribunals which does
not involve some issue of practice or procedure. Many of the
points raised are so well-settled that it is remarkable that the
higher courts reiterate established principles with such patience.
Some cases do, however, involve unsettled questions of procedural
law and they are here summarized and arranged in substantially
the same order as they would probably occur in the conduct of
litigation.
AVAILABILITY

OF

REMEDIES

Primary concern should always be manifested over the question of jurisdiction, particularly in the sense of the power to
hear and determine, for otherwise the efforts of the practitioner
may come to naught. _ Jurisdiction over tort cases instituted in
the Municipal Court of Chicago, for example, is limited to situations wherein the amount of damage does not exceed one thousand dollars, with some small exceptions.' An attempt to confer
jurisdiction on that court in an action based on fraud and deceit
involving more than the jurisdictional limit under the guise that
the claim was one arising from contract was refuted in Fine v.
Unschuld 2 when it appeared that plaintiff was not relying upon
any right to rescind and seek return of the consideration paid 3
30 Laws 1945, p. 1323, H. B. 676; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 121J, § 99.
31 323 Ill. App. 74, 55 N. E. (2d) 101 (1944), noted in 23 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
REvIEw 188.

1I1. Rev. Stats. 1945, Ch. 37, § 357. See also, Malina v. Oplatka, 304 I1. 381,
136 N. E. 666 (1922).
2 324 Il1. App. 274, 58 N. E. (2d) 251 (1944).
3 Arnold v. Dodson, 193 Il1. App. 62 (1915), affirmed in 272 Ill. 377, 112 N. E.
70 (1916).
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but rather sought damages predicated on the fraud perpetrated
upon her.
The confusion over the jurisdiction of city courts produced by
the decision in Werner v. Illinois Central Railroad Company 4
has not yet abated if the decisions in two recent cases are at all
indicative. Both involved claims that divorces granted by city
courts were invalid for lack of jurisdiction. In one, that of
Cullen v. Stevens, 5 collateral attack on the divorce decree was
denied because the essential facts showing lack of jurisdiction
were to be found, if at all, only in the certificate of evidence. By
concluding that a certificate of evidence is no part of the record
open to examination on collateral attack, 6 the court found the
decree sustained by the presumption that judicial records import
verity although the evidence de hors the record tended to indicate
7
the opposite. In the other case, Riddlesbarger v. Riddlesbarger
the collateral attack was sustained, despite the apparent validity
of the record in the city court proceeding, because the court found
that fraud was present in inducing the city court to take jurisdiction. The court there distinguished between essential fraud at
the outset, preventing the acquisition of jurisdiction," and fraud
perpetrated in the course of the proceeding which would sustain
a bill of review but is not open to inquiry in collateral proceedingsY Although Section 5 of the Divorce Act 10 has been
held valid as a venue provision," it hasnot enlarged the jurisdiction of city courts in divorce matters, so grave caution
should be exercised before resort is had to such institutions
except in cases between the residents of the city upon causes
of action arising therein.
Legislative attention to questions of jurisdiction may also
4379 Il1. 559, 42 N. E. (2d) 82 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW RE IEw
116.
Smith, J., dissented.
5 389 Ill. 35, 58 N. E. (2d) 456 (1945).
6 Sharp v. Sharp, 333 I1. 267. 164 N. E. 685 (1928), was distinguished.
7 324 Ill. App. 176, 57 N. E. (2d) 901 (1944).
863 (1937). Leave to
8 In re Estate of Goldberg, 288 Ill. App. 203, 5 N. E. (2d)
appeal denied, 288 Ill. App. xv. Cert. den., Goldberg v. Goldberg, 302 U. S. 693, 58
S. Ct. 12, 82 L. Ed. 535 (1937).
9 See People v. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354 at 364, 192 N. E. 229 at 233 (1934).
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 40, § 6.
11 McFarlin v. McFarlin, 384 Ill. 428, 51 N. E. (2d) 520 (1943).
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be observed. The act to establish appellate courts has been
modified so as to confer jurisdiction over appeals taken in
adoption proceedings, 12 and also to permit the creation of additional branch courts whenever the business of any Appellate
Court "shall warrant," rather than when the number of pending
cases exceeds 250.13 The new branches so created may be disbanded when the need has ceased. 1 4 Although the legislature saw
fit to amend the City Courts Act so as to make it possible to create
similar courts in any incorporated town superseding a civil township,"5 it did nothing to clarify the meaning of the jurisdictional
words "in and for" any city as used in such statute.16 An entirely
new Court of Claims has, however, been established. 7
Jurisdiction over the plaintiff is conferred by the mere fact of
instituting suit.' s Little has been said during the year as to the
equally important problem of securing jurisdiction over the
defendant. One principle that has proved unusually harsh in
the past has, however, now been removed by legislative action.
Section 20 of the Civil Practice Act, relating to appearances, has
been amended, so as to provide that a special appearance may be
made either in person or by attorney and, if made by attorney,
shall not be deemed to be a general appearance. 19 While the
statute does violence to the fundamental theory behind the use of
the special appearance, it prevents rise of the claim that submission to jurisdiction has occurred because a general appearance
20
was used when the obvious intention was not to submit.
Choice of tribunal and manner of acquiring jurisdiction having
been determined, it then becomes a matter of concern to see that
Rev. Stat.
12 Laws 1945, p. 649, H. B. 220, and Laws 1945, p. 648, H. B. 810; Ill.
1945, Ch. 37, § 32.
'13Laws 1945, p. 646, H. B. 573; I1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 37, § 45. Compare with
Il.' Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 37, § 45.
14 Laws 1945, p. 647, H. B. 574; I1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 37, §§ 52 and 54.
It is
'5 Laws 1945, p. 652. S. B. 190; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 37, § 333 et seq.
believed that only the Town of Cicero could take advantage of this amendment.
16 Problems evoked by Werner v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 379 II. 559, 42
N. E. (2d) 82 (1942), have not, therefore, been resolved by legislative action.
17 Laws 1945, p. 660, S. B. 462; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 37, § 439.1 et seq.
isWilson Bros. v. Haege, 347 Ill. 140, 179 N. E. 459 (1932).
Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 144.
'9 Laws 1945, p. 1148, H. B. 215; Ii.
20 See, for example. Consolidated Gasoline Co. v. Lexow, 316 Ill. App. 257, 44
N. E. (2d) 927 (1942).
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the action-is promptly instituted. In order to prevent the running
of the statute of limitations it has generally been regarded as
necessary that a suit not only be instituted in apt time but also
that it be filed in a court having jurisdiction to entertain such a
cause. Statutes exist, however, which purport to permit the transfer of cases filed in the wrong court to the proper court or county
in which the same should have been instituted.2 ' A statute of
that character had been held ineffective by the Illinois Supreme
Court to save a case instituted in apt time but in a court lacking
jurisdiction if the transfer did not occur within the applicable
period of limitation. 22 Upon certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court because a cause of action based on a federal
statute was involved, that court held in Herb v. Pitcairn23 that,
so far as the federal statute of limitations was concerned, the
action had been instituted in apt time provided there was a state
statute calling for change of venue to a court that had jurisdic24
tion.
Differences in the prevailing period of limitation applying to
written and oral contracts 25 produced a dispute in Novosk v.
Reznick 26 as to the time within which a third-party beneficiary
must sue when the contract which is the foundation of his right
of action is in writing but does not expressly name the beneficiary. By applying the rule that if a contract is only partly
reduced to writing, so that parol proof must be resorted to in
order to show with whom the bargain has been made, then the
shorter period applies, 27 the court concluded that the unnamed
21
22

347.

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 146, § 36.
Herb v. Pitcairn, 384 Il1. 237, 51 N. E. (2d) 277 (1943), noted in 32 Ill. B. J.

65 S. Ct. 954, 89 L. Ed. (adv.) 931 (1945), noted in 23 CHICAGO23 - U. S. -,
KENT LAW RrViEw 341. See an earlier aspect of the case in - U. S. -, 65 S. Ct.
459, 89 L. Ed. (adv.) 481 (1945), noted in 33 Ill. B. J. 238.
24 It is understood that, upon return of the mandate, the Illinois Supreme Court
re-examined the problem, came to the conclusion that the city court in which the
action had been instituted possessed a special and limited jurisdiction to grant
transfer, hence found the suit was started in sufficient time in a court possessing
jurisdiction so not barred by any statute of limitation. See opinion, case No.
27275-6, not yet reported.
25 Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 83, § 16 with ibid., § 17.
26 323 Il. App. 544, 56 N. E. (2d) 318 (1944).
27 Railway P. & F. Conductors' Mut. Aid & Ben. Ass'n v. Loomis, 142 Ill. 560,
32 N. E. 424 (1892).
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third-party beneficiary was obligated to sue within five years
rather than ten.
It is fundamental law that the plaintiff must not only be a
person entitled to complain but must also be one entitled to sue
in the capacity in which he names himself. If he sues in a representative capacity, he must measure up to the requirements
laid down in Hansberry v. Lee. 21 In two such cases arising during the year, Illinois courts were obligated to resolve questions
on this score. In Newberry Library v. Board of Education,29 the
Illinois Supreme Court held that a holder of bonds, part of a
single issue, could not make his action res adjudicata as to the
other holders merely by asserting that he sued in their behalf, for
it was there decided the several holders did not constitute a common class. The Appellate Court, in Hintze v. Allen, s0 went even
farther when it dismissed a representative suit by certain property owners which sought to nullify restrictive covenants in deeds
to lots in a particular subdivision. It held that as no common
interest existed 3 ' a decree nullifying or modifying the restrictions would affect the interests of persons not served with process
and would deny to them the due process required by both state
and federal constitutions. 3 2 A practice which had become fairly
common prior to the decision in the Hansberry case, that of
casting many forms of litigation over private rights into class
suits not only to bind the other members of the class but also to
force them to contribute to the cost, seems now definitely headed
for elimination.
Suits by taxpayers to enjoin expenditure of public funds, on
the other hand, are not uncommon and any person so suing as the
28 311 U. S. 32, 61 S. Ct. 115, 85 L. Ed. 22 (1940), noted in 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
Rnvrw 69, 20 ibid., p. 76, 26 Corn. L. Q. 317, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 829, 89 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 525, reversing 372 Ill.369, 24 N. E. (2d) 37 (1939), noted in 35 Ill. L.
Rev. 213, 7 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 563.
29387 I. 85, 55 N. E. (2d) 147 (1944), noted in 23 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
82, 43 Mich. L. Rev. 413.
30326 I1. App. 182, 61 N. E. (2d) 259 (1945).
31 See Otto v. Alexander, 383 Ill. 482, 50 N. E. (2d) 511 (1943).
32 Iil. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 2; U. S. Const., 14th Amend.
33 It had even been the practice to use the representative suit as a basis for
enjoining others from asserting their individual rights. That practice was nullified
by Peoples Store of Roseland v. McKibben, 379 Ill. 148, 39 N. E. (2d) 995 (1942),
noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 23.

:
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representative of all taxpayers is generally regarded as a proper
5
party plaintiff. 4 Attempts were made, in Krebs v. Thompson,
to affix qualifications to that doctrine to the effect that (1) no taxpayer could sue to enjoin expenditures under an allegedly unconstitutional statute unless he was also a person upon whom the
statute would directly operate, and (2) could show that the income
arising therefrom would be less than the cost of administering
the act. Neither contention was upheld.
Not only is a proper plaintiff necessary to every suit but the
defendant must also be a person capable of being sued. There
has been no change in the common-law rule that an unincorporated
voluntary association cannot be sued by its association name for
it is neither a natural nor an artificial person. 6 Dicta in Vischer
v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc.,8 7 however, would seem to indicate that
a business trust organized under a Massachusetts statute could
be sued as an entity in the courts of this state for the reason that
the enabling act fixed upon it the power to sue and be sued."' No
similar statute is to be found in Illinois, hence suits against business trusts formed here should follow the common-law pattern.8 9
There is little to say on the subject of chosing an appropriate
remedy, for no change has occurred in established doctrines regulating suits at law. Fundamental distinctions do still exist between legal and equitable actions, 40 however, even though distinctions in the manner of pleading between them have been
abolished. 4 ' As a consequence, a person may not prosecute a suit
in equity if he possesses an adequate remedy at law. The holding
in Webster v. Hall,4 2 though, is rather unusual for the court
34 Fergus v. Russell, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N. E. 130, Ann. Cas. 1916B 1120 (1915).
The court there indicated that it did not regard the question "as any longer an
open one."
85387 Ill. 471, 56 N. E. (2d) 761 (1944).
3 Kingsley v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, etc., 323 Ill. App. 353, 55 N. E. (2dy
554 (1944).
37325 Ill. App. 104, 59 N. E. (2d) 884 (1945).
8 Motion to dismiss for lack of Jurisdiction was sustained because process was
not served upon the trustee who is declared to be the statutory agent of the trust :
325 Il. App. 104 at 122, 59 N. E. (2d) 884 at 892.
39 See Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, 328 Ill. 321, 159 N. E. 250, 58 A. L. R. 485
(1927).
40 111. Rev. Stat. 1945. Ch. 110, § 259.10.
4' Ibid., Ch. 110, § 155.
42 388 I1. 401, 58 N. E. (2d) 575 (1945), noted in 33 Ill. B. J. 309.
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therein affirmed a decree dismissing a suit for want of equity
because an adequate legal remedy existed when it would have
been expected that the decision should have been to transfer the
case to the law side of the docket.43 It is true that the plaintiff
therein made no request for such transfer, apparently believing
that he did possess an equitable right to recover, so the case cannot be construed as refuting the clear direction of the statute.
Had plaintiff refused to permit the proffered transfer, the court
would have had no alternative but to dismiss the suit."
One new statutory remedy has been provided. A long-felt
need in the procedural law of this state has at last been satisfied
by the enactment of a statute permitting courts to pronounce
declaratory judgments. 45 Modelled somewhat after the federal
act, 48 the Illinois statute is available for use only where the
declaratory judgment will serve to terminate the controversy, but
in such situations the judgment may be given enforcible effect if
necessary. Until a body of precedent interpreting the use of
the act in this state has been accumulated, it is likely that the
practitioner will be obliged to go afield to find persuasive
authority on doubtful points.47
Fullest efficacy to a proceeding in equity has heretofore been
provided through the doctrine of lis pendens by which a person
dealing with the subject matter after suit has been instituted
must take the same cure onere. There are implications in Cairo
Lumber. Company, Incorporated v. Corwin,4 though, that such
doctrine has ceased to possess full vitality in this state for it was
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 168 (2).
Barger v. First Nat. Bank of Danville, 310 Ill.App. 628, 35 N. E. (2d) 556
(1941), noted In 20 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 97.
45 Laws 1945, p. 1149, H. B. 217; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 181.1.
4628 U. S. C. A. §400.
47 Textual treatment of the subject may be found In Borchard, Declaratory
Judgments (Cleveland: Banks-Baldwin Law Pub. Co., 1941), 2d Ed., and Anderson,
Actions for Declaratory Judgments (St. Paul: West Pub. Co., 1940). Serviceable
law review articles appear in 29 Ill. L. Rev. 1 and 174, 33 Col. L. Rev. 648, 20
Corn. L. Q. 1, and 11 Tenn. L. Rev. 217. The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,
with annotations, is set forth in 9 U. L. A. 215 et seq. It is to be regretted that
the proponents of the new legislation did not follow the action of twenty-six other
states in using the uniform act as a model.
48 325 Ill. App. 319, 60 N. E. (2d) 110 (1945).
43
44
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there indicated that Section 53 of the Chancery Act 4' has been
repealed, at least by implication if not expressly, by reason of
language contained in Section 76 of the Civil Practice Act.5 0 In
that case, a purchaser at private sale took title to land which had
been the subject of a creditor's suit subsequent to a decree dismissing the suit but while the case was pending on appeal. After
the purchase, the decree was reversed in favor of the creditor.
It was held that the interim sale to a bona-fide purchaser had to
be protected since the appeal had not been made to operate as a
supersedeas. It is a little strained to say that Section 53 of the
Chancery Act has been repealed when the history thereof shows
that it was amended by the legislature subsequent to the adoption
of the Civil Practice Act section referred to,5 1 and as an appeal
constitutes a continuation of the same suit 52 it would seem as
though the original lis pendens notice should continue in effect
until the ultimate determination thereof. While the language of
the Civil Practice Act would seem to protect the rights of purchasers after decree and before reversal, whether at public or
private sale,53 the obvious intention thereof would seem to be to
provide protection for purchasers from judgment or decree
creditors who, in the absence or reversal of the decree, would have
no title to convey. Permitting a sale by the original owner to be
treated as valid, despite the notice provided by virtue of lis
pendens, because the creditor's suit is dislmissed for want of
equity and he has not had time to convert his appeal into a supersedeas is gratuitously favoring one who, by later reversal, is
54
shown to be a party to a fraud or claiming under such a person.
PREPARATION

OF

PLEADINGS

The pleader was formerly required to state different breaches
of duty in separate counts to avoid the charge that he had been
49

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 22, § 53.

5o

Ibid., Ch. 110, § 200(1).

51 The Chancery Act was amended by Laws 1935, p. 247, while the essential language of the Civil Practice Act, § 200(1), has been in existence since Laws 1933,
p. 806, even though the section has been amended In other respects since then.
52 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 198(1).
53 The court held that Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 200(1), was not confined in
operation to judicial sales: 325 Ill. App. 319 at 324, 60 N. E. (2d) 110 at 113.
54 In Herrington v. McCollum, 73 Ill. 476 (1874), the purchaser was protected be-
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guilty of duplicity.5 5 That rule was changed at the time of the
adoption of the Civil Practice Act, 56 so it was held proper in Winn
v. Underwood57 to incorporate in one count two or more causes of
action growing out of violations of the same statute provided the
same arose from the one transaction.5 8 The court did indicate,
however, that if the wrongs were committed by several defendants acting jointly and one of them had died in the meantime,
then it would be better practice to state the causes of action
against the survivors in one count and present a separate count
to cover the case against the administrator of the deceased wrongdoer since a separate and different type of judgment would be
necessary against the latter.5 9
An excellent illustration for the use of alternative pleadings 60
is provided by People ex rel. Ray v. Lewistown Community High
School District,61 wherein the plaintiff filed a complaint in the
nature of quo warranto containing several counts under some of
which he charged that the school district usurped powers not
belonging to it while under other counts he alleged that the individual members of the board unlawfully assumed to exercise the
powers of a school district. Defendants contended that, having
acknowledged the existence of the school district under certain
of the counts, plaintiff could not also claim that it had not been
validly organized. While quo warranto proceedings were originally exempted from the operation of the Civil Practice Act,6 2 the
present statute controlling the use thereof assimilates the practice therein to that used in other civil proceedings. 63 It was,
cause no action was taken to revive the dismissed action for two years. Smith v.
Herdllcka, 323 Ill. 585, 154 N. E. 414 (1926), involved an even longer delay. They
do not present situations similar to the Instant case. If the original suit can be
said to be pending in any respect, Jackson v. Warren, 32 Il. 331 (1863), the lis
pendens notice still possesses vitality.
55 Chicago West Division Ry. Co. v. Ingraham, 131 Ill. 659, 23 N. E. 350 (1890).
56 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 259.12.
57 325 Ill. App. 297, 60 N. E. (2d) 116 (1945).
58 Randall Dairy Co. v. Pevely Dairy Co., 278 Ill. App. 350 (1935), was distinguished on the ground that the several causes there concerned grew out of wholly
unrelated transactions.
59 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 157 and § 174.
Go Ibid., Ch. 110, § 167(2).
61388 Ill. 78, 57 N. E. (2d) 486 (1944).

62 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 125.
63 Ibid., Ch. 112, § 15.

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

therefore, held not only proper but necessary to use alternative
pleading so as to get all proper parties before the court.6 4 Tacit
admissions in one aspect of the suit were held not to control the
determination of the other, although they were binding in the
part of the case in which they were made. 5
A reminder to the pleader to attach to his complaint any
exhibits on which he relies is to be found in Morris v. Goldthorp.66
The court there stated that an additional reason for Section 36 of
the Civil Practice Act 67 lies in the fact that the court might need
such exhibits in order to pass upon a motion to dismiss. It
accordingly gave the section mandatory effect.
Little has been said about defensive pleadings. In Hunsley v.
Aull,68 however, the court held that since alternative pleading is
permitted, it is not unfair to require the defendant to state all
possible theories to sustain his defense so as to apprise his
opponent of the claims he will or may rely upon. Failure
to assert a possible defense in the answer was, as a consequence,
taken as ground for precluding the party from the advantage
thereof even though its existence appeared from the evidence.
That ruling might seem harsh were it not for the fact that no
answer so
request was made to permit the filing of an amended
the proof.69
as to have the pleadings conform to
In an ordinary civil action, failure to file a reply denying an
affirmative defense contained in an answer will usually result in
the plaintiff being deemed to have admitted the defensive matter.70

It was argued, in Firke v. McClure,7 1 that such rule did

not apply to ejectment proceedings, particularly where defendant
had filed the general denial permitted therein,72 on the ground
64 Although the respective claims constituted separate suits, they were held properly joined in one action since they arose out of the same transaction or series of
transactions: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 148.
65 People ex rel. Weber v. City of Spring Valley, 129 Ill. 169, 21 N. E. 843 (1889).
66 390 Ill. 186, 60 N. E. (2d) 857 (1945).
67 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 160.
68387 Ill. 520, 56 N. E. (2d) 773 (1944).
69 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 170(3),
But see Snively v. Crownover, 321 Ill. App. 292, 53
70 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 164(2).
N. E. (2d) 7 (1944), noted in 23 CHICAGo-KENT LAW Ravimw 27.
71389 Ill 543, 60 N. E. (2d) 220 (1945).
72 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 45, § 19.
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that affirmative pleadings are there unnecessary. The court held,
however, that if affirmative pleadings are used they have the same
effect as in other civil suits by reason of the fact that the practice
and procedure in ejectment is similar to that found in other
actions.7
THE

TRIAL

OF

THE

CASE

74
Although technical rules of evidence have gone unchanged,
one point respecting the manner of obtaining proof was dealt
with by the courts and one by the legislature. The trial court,
in Boettcher v. Howard Engraving Company,75 struck defensive
pleadings and entered judgment by default for failure to make
discovery upon interrogatories propounded by the other party.
That action purported to have support in a rule of court. 76 The
higher court declared the rule invalid for want of statutory
authority, 77 as well because it would violate constitutional rights
to due process, to enter judgment without a hearing."s The remedy seems rather to be in punishment for contumacy. 79 Where
documentary evidence is sought, it is no longer necessary to
procure an order of court before subpoena duces tecum may issue
by reason of a brief addition to Section 62 of the Civil Practice
Act.80

While the actual trial is usually conducted before a judge,
the practice in equity permits a hearing before the master or
his substitute, to-wit: a special commissioner. An interesting
point has been raised in the case of Simpson v. Harrison,s"
Ibid., Ch. 45, § 10.
74 Attention Is directed to Moscov v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 387 Ill. 378, 56 N. E.
(2d) 399 (1944), dealing with the subject of judicial notice of foreign law, noted
post, p. 68.
75 389 Il1. 75, 58 N. E. (2d) 866 (1945).
76 Rule 201 of the Superior Court of Cook County, adopted May 1, 1944, declares
that if a party fails to comply, the court may strike that person's pleadings and
73

"enter a judgment by default against that party."

77 While Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 182, provides for discovery, it attaches no
penalty for failure or refusal to make disclosure.
78 Walter Cabinet Co. v. Russell, 250 11. 416, 95 N. E. 462 (1911).
79 See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1, 61 S. Ct. 422, 85 L. Ed. 479 (1941).
80 Laws 1945, p. 1150, H. B. 209; Ill. Rev,. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 186. Hitherto,
such an order was necessary: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 51, § 9. The latter statute
does not appear to have been repealed.
81 389 Ill. 588, 60 N. E. (2d) 104 (1945).
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although it has not yet been decided,8 2 concerning the right of a
court of equity to appoint a special commissioner to take
proofs and make findings of fact and recommendations based
thereon. The argument against the validity of the appointment
of a special commissioner proceeds on the theory that the general
power of appointment which heretofore existed " was repealed at
the time of the enactment of the Civil Practice Act8 4 and the only
authority presently permitting the use of a special commissioner,
except in special instances,"5 requires that it appear that the
regularly constituted master in chancery be disqualified or unable
to act or his position be vacant.8 6 The practice of making frequent use of special commissioners, such as has been indulged in
in some counties, may be checked if the argument is sustained.
After the evidence is in, a litigant may find it necessary to
take a voluntary non-suit. Before he does so, he should exercise
caution as once the action has been taken he cannot retract according to Fulton v. Yondorf.87 If he does erroneously dismiss his
case as to one of several defendants he cannot, merely by motion
to vacate the dismissal order, reinstate the cause as to such
defendant but must begin his action anew 81 or else file an amended
complaint and have new process issued to reacquire jurisdiction
over the individual.19 The right to take a voluntary nonsuit is
also circumscribed by statute 90 which places limitations thereon
after "trial or hearing begins." It was held, in Bernick v. Chicago Title & Trust Company, 91 that after hearing had on a motion
to dismiss on the ground of res adjudicata, 92 although no decision
82 The cause was ordered transferred to the Appellate Court for the First District on the ground that no freehold was involved. That court has not yet announced any decision on the question.
83 Cahill, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1931, Ch. 22, § 39.
84 111. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 218. See Laws 1933, p. 812.
85 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 40, § 16, and Ch. 68, § 22.
86 Ibid., Ch. 90, § 5.
87 324 Ill. App. 452, 58 N. E. (2d) 640 (1944), noted in 23 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvIEW 327. A comparable situation appears in Bettenhausen v. Guenther, 388 Ill.
487, 58 N. E. (2d)f 550 (1945).
88 The former practice is illustrated by Weisguth v. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur,
272 Ill. 541, 112 N. E. 350 (1916).
89 Thompson v. Otis, 285 Ill. App. 523, 2 N. E. (2d) 370 (1936), indicates the
procedural steps which should be taken.
90 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 176.
91 325 Ill..App. 495, 60 N. E. (2d) 442 (1945).
92 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 172(1) (e).
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had been pronounced thereon, it was too late to take a voluntary
nonsuit for the reason that the word "hearing" as used in the
statute had a non-technical meaning.
The scope and purpose of a motion in arrest of judgment is
considered in an ample opinion of the Appellate Court in Scott v.
Freeport Motor Casualty Company.98 The operation and effect
of that decision is far too lengthy a subject to be treated in the
compass of a survey such as this, so no attempt is made to do
so. Close attention thereto, and to the decision of the Supreme
Court on leave to appeal, 94 is invited.
Hitherto, only one judgment was permitted in any law action
even though defendant might have admitted the justice of part
of plaintiff's claim. 95 The authority to grant more than one
judgment in the same case was conferred on the courts by Section 50(1) of the Civil Practice Act, 96 but analysis of the operation of that section had to await the decision in Zimmerman v.
Bankers Life & Casualty Company.9 7 Separate judgments were
there upheld against the claim that satisfaction of the first judgment operated to bar recovery on the disputed part of plaintiff's
claim. A word of caution is there expressed, however, as to the
necessity for adequate showing, at the time of the rendition of
the first judgment, of an intention to reserve jurisdiction as to
the balance of the claim.
DAMAGES

While rules and doctrines relating to proximate cause are
used mainly to determine whether liability exists at all, they may
also be used in deciding questions of damage law for the defendant's wrongful conduct must have been a substantial factor in
93324 Ill. App. 529, 58 N. E. (2d) 618 (1945).
94 It is understood that, upon leave to appeal granted, the Illinois Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the Appellate Court and sustained the action of the trial
court. Opinion in case No. 28746, not yet reported.
15 Brewer v. Christian, 9 Ill. App. 57 (1881).
96 111. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 174(1).
97 324 Ill. App. 370, 58 N. E. (2d) 267 (1944), noted in 23 CHIcAGo-KENT LAW
RLViEW 252.
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producing the given result for which compensation is sought.,"
Where the harm suffered by plaintiff is caused by an error of
judgment on the part of a third person not encompassed within
the meaning of "proximate cause," therefore, the defendant cannot be held responsible for such harm. For that reason, it was
held error in Leech v. Newell9 9 to permit the introduction of
evidence that plaintiff, after injury in' an automobile accident,
was confined for psychopathic examination upon a complaint
made by a third person when it later developed that plaintiff was
not insane nor had been rendered so by defendant's negligent
conduct. The third person's act was said to be an intervening
cause so as to absolve defendant from any harmful consequences
flowing therefrom. Had defendant's carelessness produced insanity in the victim, a different result might have followed.'
The adequacy of the amount of damage awarded in a wrongful
death action was considered in the case of Wallace v. City of Rock
Islanrd 2 wherein the jury fixed the measure of recovery for the
wrongful death of a thirteen-year old boy at $500. While the
statute provides for the recovery of damages based on the
''pecuniary injuries resulting from death," 3 the damages are
not limited to the recovery of the present loss of money but may
include prospective advantages of a pecuniary nature.4 Verdicts
for the maximum statutory amount have been upheld in the case
of death of infants. In the light thereof, the Appellate Court
held the verdict was for no more than nominal damage and hence
had to be set aside.
The rule to be applied in measuring the damage growing out
of the deprivation of use of a vehicle was seriously examined in
Freuhauf Trailer Company v. Lydick 6 where, after rehearing, it
was decided that although the plaintiff is generally obliged to
98 See McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages (St. Paul: West Pub. Co.,
1935), pp. 260-1.
99 323 Ill. App. 510, 56 N. E. (2d) 138 (1944).
1 See Restatement, Torts, § 455.
2323 I. App. 639, 56 N. E. (2d) 636 (1944).
3 11. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 70, § 2.
4 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. warriner, 229 Ill. 91, 82 N. E. 246 (1907).
5 Deming v. City of Chicago, 321 Il1. 341, 151 N. E. 886 (1926).
6 325 Ill. App. 28, 59 N. E. (2d) 551 (1945). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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minimize damage that rule would not be strictly applicable. The
court indicated that the measure of the loss of use could either be
figured in terms of the loss of use of plaintiff's own trailer or in
terms of the rental value of another one obtained in the open
market. The two modes of measurement, therefore, appear to be
interchangeable.
A trespasser who removes property from the land of another
is entitled to no credit for his expense in so doing and must pay
the value of the property so removed in its enhanced, rather than
its original, condition.7 Where a dispute exists as to the right
of removal and injunction proceedings are begun to test that
right, however, the court acquires jurisdiction of the property
and may validly authorize the receiver to incur necessary expense
to avoid more serious loss. If, instead of the appointment of a
receiver, the parties stipulate that the defendant may continue
with the work provided he deposits the proceeds in court to await
the final outcome of the controversy, then the expense of further
operations may be charged against such fund, according to
Superior Oil Company v. Somers Drilling Company,8 even though
it subsequently develops that defendant was a trespasser in fact.
An attempt to have the federal court reject the local rule which
makes even a good-faith trespasser forfeit his expenses was
rejected despite the argument that such rule is unsound and based
on an erroneous understanding of English precedents.9
Damage inflicted upon the person whose property is taken by
exercise of the power of eminent domain has customarily been
restricted to the market value of the property taken at the time
of seizure. When the property taken constitutes the tenant's use
of real property held under a lease, the measure of recovery,
according to United States v. General Motors Corporation,10 may
be varied to include such items as the cost of removal, including
Sikes v. Moline Consumers' Co., 293 Iii. 112, 127 N. E. 342 (1920).
s143 F. (2d) 49 (1944).
9 On this point, see opinion of Lindley, D. J., in Superior Oil Co. v. Harsh, 50 F.
Supp. 358 (1943).
1o323 U. S. 373. 65 S. Ct. 357. 89 L. Ed. (adv.) 379 (1945), modifying 140 F. (2d)
873 (1944), noted in 13 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 242., 39 Ii1. L. Rev. 420, 23 Texas L.
Rev. 402, and 31 Va. L. Rev. 539.
7
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labor, materials and transportation, as well as the value of fixtures and permanent equipment destroyed or depreciated by the
taking. Whether or not the tenant is entitled to receive compensation for the partial use taken on the same basis as he is
left under an obligation to his lessor is an entirely different question. n Since he is entitled to only the "market value" of the
portion of the term taken, the measure thereof may be calculated
on a different basis than that used in the tenant's lease.
APPEAL

AND

APPELLATE

PROCEDURE

Most of the procedural difficulties have been connected with
the task of securing review of nisi prius decisions. 12 Section 77
of the Civil Practice Act 1 authorizes review of the action of a
trial court in granting a new trial under the guise of declaring
such an order to be a "final" one when, in fact, it is far from
such. The obvious purpose of the statute is to save the litigants
from the expense and burden of a new trial if one would be
improper. Action by the Appellate Court upon appeal from an
order granting a new trial is not subject to direct review by the
4
Supreme Court though, according to Kavanaugh v. Washburn,
for the order concerned is not intrinsically a final one upon which
further review is immediately possible before the higher court 15
despite the classification given to it by the legislature. The only
way by which the matter may receive final review, as indicated
therein, is for the litigant to return to the lower court with the
mandate granted upon the limited appeal 16 and, after final disposition there, proceed to carry the case again through all phases
of appellate review. That course of procedure, the court noted,
11 Mr. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion to United States v. General
Motors Corp., indicated that in his opinion an award for less than the rental imposed under the lease would not constitute "just compensation" within the meaning
of U. S. Const., Amend. V.
12 See discussion of the subject of judicial review in adoption matters in 23
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 233, and comment on Ekendahl v. Svolos, 388 Ill. 412,
58 N. E. (2d) 585 (1945), post p. 46.
13 I1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 201.
14 387 I1. 204, 56 N. E. (2d) 420 (1944).
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 199.
16 That mandate, according to the court, should require no more than that the
trial court should proceed in due course: 387 Ill. 204 at 212, 56 N. E. (2d) 420 at
423.
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is "involved and confusing," but it is .said to be the only one
available at present. To the argument that, when the case again
comes before the Appellate Court, that court would consider itself
bound by the action taken upon appeal from the order granting
a new trial, it was said that the mere similarity of questions in
the two appeals should not be deemed conclusive so as to warrant
dismissing the second appeal.
The time for taking an appeal as a matter of right has been
fixed by Section 76 of the Civil Practice Act. 17 If a motion is
made in the trial court to vacate the judgment or decree, a
problem will arise as to whether the period of time is to be
measured from the date of the original judgment or from the
time of the ruling on such motion. An intimation in an earlier
case 18 that the pendency of a motion to vacate does not operate
to stay the, running of the time for appeal was clarified in Corwin
v. Rheims.19 The court there held that if, subsequent to the
motion to vacate but before the ruling thereon, the party files a
notice of appeal he waives his earlier motion so as to make the
judgment a final and appealable one from the time of its original
rendition, but that if he does not serve notice of appeal until
after the ruling on his motion to vacate then the. period is to be
calculated from the date of such ruling, the judgment being
treated as suspended until that time.
The time for taking steps subsequent to notice of appeal is
also the subject of regulation. While not a question of jurisdictional significance, 20 compliance with such regulations will be
necessary or the appeal may be dismissed. Emphasis was given
to that proposition by the decision in People ex rel. McWard v.
Wabash Railroad Company 21 where it was held that an appeal
ought properly be dismissed if the report of proceedings in the
trial court is not filed within fifty days after appeal has been
Ili.
is See
19 390
326.
20 See
17

Rev. Stat 1945, Ch. 110, § 200.
Diebler v. Bernard Bros., Inc., 385 Ill. 610, 53 N. E. (2d) 450 (1944).
Ill. 205, 61 N. E. (2d) 40 (1945), noted in 23 CHICAGo-KENT LAW RE W
note to Lukas v. Lukas, 381 Ill. 429, 45 N. E. (2d)
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21

388 Ill. 312, 57 N. E. (2d) 851 (1944).

869 (1943),

in 21
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perfected or within any proper enlargement of that time.2 2 The
fact that several appeals are consolidated does not change the
rule as it applies to each particular appellant, nor does the fact
that one of the appellants in the consolidated cause served
notice of appeal at a later date than the others. The same case
also indicates that there can be no extenuating circumstance for
failure to comply with these rules. Matters of that character
can only be offered to support a petition for leave to appeal. In
a companion case, that of People ex rel. McWard v. Chicago d
Illinois Midland Railway Company,2 3 the court refused to enlarge
on the liberality it had previously shown on the subject of noncompliance with rules regulating the contents of the appellate
24
brief.
Rule 34 of the Supreme Court 25 requires that a copy of the
notice of appeal be served "upon each party . . . who would
be adversely affected" by any reversal or modification of the
order, judgnent or decree sought to be reviewed. Such rule is
clearly inapplicable as to any person who could not be affected
by the review other than in some beneficial fashion, so motion to
dismiss an appeal for failure to serve notice on such a person
was held properly denied in Toman v. Tufts.20
When the two former methods for obtaining appellate review
were abolished and statutory appeal was provided as a substitute, the Supreme Court wisely adopted a rule which permitted
the appellate tribunal to entertain the cause even though an
incorrect method had been pursued to bring the case before it.21
The decision in Kamienski v. Bluebird Air Service, Incorporated,28 confines the operation of that rule to cases where appeal
is available as a matter of right. If, as in that case, appellate
22 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 259.36.

23 388 Ill. 325, 57 N. E. (2d) 853 (1944).
24 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 259.39. See also Swain v. Hoberg, 380 Ill. 442,
44 N. E. (2d) 38 (1942), reversing 312 inl. App. 610, 38 N. E. (2d) 966 (1942), noted
in 20 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 264.

25 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 259.34.
26 323 Ill. App. 516, 56 N. E. (2d) 135 (1944).
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 259.28. See also In re Petition of Ekendahl, 321
Ill. App. 457, 53 N. E. (2d) 302 (1944).
28 389 Ill. 462, 59 N. E.

(2d) 853 (1945).
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review is a matter of grace 29 and can be obtained only on the
granting of leave to appeal, improvident use of a writ of error
will not save the case. To give the rule in question the effect
claimed by the appellant therein would deprive the higher court
of its discretion on the question of whether to grant leave to
appeal or not.
An appeal does not presently operate as a supersedeas, unless
bond is given in conformity with Section 82 of the Civil Practice
Act,30 so the judgment or decree creditor is entitled to enforce
the same even though appeal is pending. The fact that the
debtor, unable or unwilling to seek supersedeas, satisfies the
judgment or decree by compulsion while the appeal is pending
does not operate to render the matter moot according to First
National Bank of Jonesboro v. Road District No. 8, Union
County 31 where it was deemed error to dismiss an appeal for
that reason. Should the judgment or decree be reversed, titles
acquired under the erroneous judgment or decree will be divested
at least as between the parties to the proceeding 32 and rights to
restitution for money paid will then arise.
While supersedeas may operate to stay the enforcement of
an ordinary judgment, the same thing is not true of a judgment
rendered in certiorari proceedings for such judgments are selfexecuting and have operated effectively immediately upon pronouncement unless subsequently reversed. A motion in People
ex rel. Barry v. Gregory 33 that the appeal there taken be made
to operate as a supersedeas was denied on the ground that the
provisions of the Civil Practice Act on the subject 34 do not
constitute such a special statute as would be necessary to change
29 Appellant sought review in the supreme Court of a decision by the Appellate
Court, 321 Ill. App. 340, 53 N. E. (2d) 131 (1944).
Further review was possible
only pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 199(2).
30 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 206.
31 389 111. 156, 58 N. E. (2d) 884 (1945), reversing 322 I1. App. 293, 54 N. E. (2d)
847 (1944).
32 Ure v. Ure, 223 Ill. 454, 79 N. E. 153, 114 Am. St. Rep. 336 (1906) ; McJllton v.
Love, 13 Ill. 486, 54 Am. Dec. 449 (1851).
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 200 and
Ch. 77, § 35a serve to protect the rights of persons not parties thereto.
33 324 I1. App. 614, 59 N. E. (2d) 106 (1944).
34 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 206.
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the general rule as it relates to certiorari proceedings. Earlier
precedents under prior practice acts were held controlling. 5
Rule 22 of the Supreme Court"3 was amended after the
decision in Goodrich v. Sprague 37 to permit the trial court to
pass upon alternative motions for new trial and for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict so as to facilitate the ultimate disposition of the case on appeal. When the case is considered on
appeal, therefore, the appellate tribunal, if it reverses the action
granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict, should also pass
upon the ruling on the motion for new trial. It would be error
to reverse on the first question alone, for the mandate would then
operate to direct the trial court to enter judgment on the verdict
without giving appellant a chance to secure review of the order
refusing to grant a new trial. 38 For these reasons, it was held
to be error in Millikan National Bank of Decatur v. Shellabarger
Grain Products Company 39 for the Appellate Court to reverse
the order granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict without also passing on the question of defendant's right to a new
trial. The Supreme Court declared itself unable to decide the
40
latter point for it was not in a position to weigh the evidence.
One other minor point of appellate procedure might be
mentioned. Although the legislature, when enacting the present
Justices and Constables Act, 41 apparently intended a complete
revision of the law, they did not expressly repeal all prior acts
on the subject. One former provision declared that informalities
in the appeal bond filed in an appeal from a justice of the peace
should not be ground for dismissing the appeal but that the
appellant might, if necessary, amend the bond within a reason85 People ex rel. McDonnell v. Thompson, 316 Ill. 11, 146 N. E. 473 (1925)
People ex rel. Dibelka v. Reinberg, 263 Ill. 536, 105 N. E. 715, L. R. A. 1915E 401
(1914).
86 I1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 259.22.
37376 Ill. 80, 32 N. E. (2d) 897 (1941), reversing 304 Ill. App. 556, 26 N. E. (2d)
884 (1940).
88 Such motion would necessarily be denied if judgment was granted notwithstanding the verdict.
39 389 Ill. 196, 58 N. E. (2d) 892 (1945), reversing 322 Il. App. 189, 54 N. E. (2d)
392 (1944).
40 Gnat v. Richardson, 378 Ill. 626, 39 N. E. (2d) 337 (1942).
41 Il. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 79, § 1 et seq.
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able time to cure defects therein. 42 It was held, in Antrim v.
Guyer & Calkins Company,48 that such statute still had operative
effect and, as a consequence, it was error to dismiss an appeal
from a decision of a justice of the peace because the bond was
44
lacking a surety.
ENFORCEMENT

OF JUDGMENTS

Efforts to defeat the enforcement of judgments usually lead to
litigation, not infrequently because the fraudulent debtor has
difficulty in obtaining the return of his property after danger is
past. In Staufenbiel v. Staufenbiel,45 the grantor sought the aid
of equity to recover an interest in land conveyed to his brother
in anticipation of divorce. Upon finding that the parties had
dealt in real estate on a confidential basis for several years, the
court granted relief on the ground that a fiduciary relationship
existed. The rule of parti delicto was rejected because the court
failed to find that the grantor's wife had, in fact, been defrauded.
The creditor in Ziegler v. Obernuefemann,4 however, suceeded in
upsetting a conveyance by a debtor to his children made upon
a stated consideration of one dollar but lacking in revenue
stamps. A claim that true consideration for the conveyance
existed because the grantor was indebted to his children for
work done by them on the farm was rejected when the court
noted that "there must be clear and satisfactory proof of a
valid and subsisting debt" 47 in situations of this character.
The rights of the judgment creditor against property held in
joint tenancy between the debtor and another were discussed in
two cases. Mauricau v. Haugen 41 involved a situation where
title was held of record in the name of husband and wife as
joint tenants, and levy and sale was attempted under an execution against the husband. The wife was permitted to enjoin the
§ 69; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 79, § 180.
43 324 Ill. App. 641, 59 N. E. (2d) 316 (1945).
44 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 79, § 116, sets forth the form of the bond to be used
which, from Its language, indicates that surety is required.
45 338 Il1. 511, 58 N. E. (2d) 569 (1944).
46 323 Ill. App. 317, 55 N. E. (2d) 539 (1944).
47 323 Ill. App. 317 at 321, 55 N. E. (2d) 539 at 541.
48 387 Ill. 186, 56 N. E. (2d) 367 (1944).
42 Laws 1872,
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sale because the property in fact belonged to her and the deed
in joint tenancy had been issued in error. The court held that
the judgment lien 49 extended only to the debtor's actual, rather
than to his apparent, interest so long as no fraud had been
perpetrated on the creditor nor any reliance placed on the
apparent ownership. The effect of the severance of a joint
tenancy by death of the judgment debtor after levy but prior
to sale was considered in Van Antwerp v. Horan.50 It was there
held proper to enjoin further proceedings under the execution
because the mere levy had not destroyed the joint tenancy or
affected the right of survivorship so the property passed to the
surviving joint tenant free of the judgment lien.
Questions concerning the right to reach the contents of a
safety-deposit box by garnishment proceedings were presented
in Morris v. Beatty.51 The Appellate Court held that the conduct of the vault proprietor in permitting the judgment debtor
to have access to the box after service of demand made it liable
unless it could show that there was no property contained therein
subject to garnishment. Upon leave to appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed upon the technical ground that there had been
no traverse filed to the garnishee's answer denying control over
the contents of the box. 52 The fundamental issue as to whether
such property may be reached by the creditor, and in what
fashion, was left unanswered. A slight change in the Garnishment Act requires that the form of wage demand made necessary
by Section 14 thereof must hereafter include a statement of the
name of the court and the date of the judgment upon which the
demand is based.5 3
The operation and effect of judgments based on the Dram
Shop Act 54 were also made the subject of consideration in two
cases. Skiras v. Magenis 55 decides that a judgment rendered in
49 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 77, § 1.

50390 Ill. 449, 61 N. E. (2d) 358 (1945).
51 323 Ill. App. 390, 55 N. E. (2d) 830 (1944), noted in 23 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 182, 43 Mich. L. Rev. 792.
52 Morris v. Beatty, 390 Il. 568, 62 N. E. (2d) 478 (1945).
53 Laws 1945, p. 936, H. B. 682; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 62, § 14.
54 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 43, § 135 et seq.
55 324 Ill. App. 250, 58 N. E. (2d) 323 (1944).
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such an action against several defendants is a unit judgment, as
in other civil cases, hence if invalid as to one is invalid as to
all.5 6 In the other case, that of Gibbons v. CannavenF judgment had been obtained against the lessee, a tavern keeper, and
proceedings were then instituted to foreclose the judgment lien
against the demised premises. 5s The lessor sought leave to appeal
from the law judgment but his application was denied on the
ground that, as he had not been named defendant nor had been
given leave to intervene, he possessed no right to appeal. The
claim that such a result violated due process was said to be
lacking in force for procedure of like character under a former
statute bad been upheld on the ground that the mere act of
leasing premises for dram shop purposes amounted to a waiver
of usual requirements.5 9 The case forcefully demonstrates the
proposition that a judgment lien may attach to land in Illinois
without either personal service upon or notice by publication
to the owner.
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
It is fundamental law that the accused cannot be convicted of
a crime unless it can be shown that he has engaged in some forbidden act or has failed to perform some duty imposed on him
by law. The absence of proof of any overt act on defendant's
part, therefore, required that a conviction in the case of People
v. Hensley' for maintaining a public nuisance be reversed without remanding. It appeared therein that a corporately-owned
pipe line carrying oil had broken and the escaping oil had tainted
the local water supply. The defendant company superintendant
acted promptly to repair the break and remedy the condition
created, but despite this was prosecuted under a statute which
2
declares it to be a public nuisance to corrupt any water supply.
56 The claim of invalidity rested in the fact that one of the defendants was a
minor and a default judgment had been taken without the appointment of a
guardian ad litem.
57325 Ill. App. 337, 60 N. E. (2d) 254 (1945).
58 An enforcible lien is expressly conferred by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 43, § 136.
59 See Garrity v. Eiger, 272 Ill. 127, 111 N. E. 735 (1916), affirmed in 246 U. S. 97,
38 S. Ct. 298, 62 L. Ed. 596 (1918).
1325 Ill. App. 291, 60 N. E. (2d) 114 (1945).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 466(3),.
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It did not appear that defendant had anything to do with the
purchase or installation of the defective equipment nor had he
any warning that the line was in defective condition, so reversal
of the conviction was clearly justified.
Of interest, though scarcely any longer of practical value, is
the decision in People v. Dunswortha wherein it was held that
United States gasoline rationing coupons constituted property
which could be the subject of larceny and might, therefore, be
received as stolen property. The contention that such coupons
belonged to the federal issuing agency and not to the named
victim was rejected on the ground that the latter's possession at
the time of the theft was enough to support the charge. 4 Regarded
as equally without foundation was the argument that as the
coupons possessed no value it could not be said that the victim
suffered any loss, for pecuniary loss to the victim is not regarded
as essential.5
All other cases arising during the year involved no new
points of criminal law, but statutory additions to the Criminal
Code now make it criminal to handle sulfa drugs except on prescription, 6 to bribe participants in sporting events or athletic
contests, 7 to disseminate false or misleading advertisements,$
to broadcast defamatory matter by radio, 19 or to defraud a
newsboy under eighteen.' 0 Penalties have also been provided
for selling commercial fertilizers having less than a minimum
percentage of certain ingredients," for operating an unlicensed
community currency exchange,' 2 for employing minors in contravention of a new child labor law,' 3 for failing to pay women
employees less than a minimum fair wage, 1 4 or for operating
3 323 I1. App. 470, 56 N. E. (2d) 52 (1944).
4 People v. Fitzgerald, 297 Ill. 264, 130 N. E. 720 (1921).
5 People v. Racine, 362 Ill. 602, 1 N. E. (2d) 63 (1936).
6 Laws 1945, p. 693, H. B. 407; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 186a-b.
7 Laws 1945, p. 681, H. B. 137; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 83a et seq.
8 Laws 1945, p. 680, S. B. 91; Il. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 249a.
9 Laws 1945, p. 683, S. B. 235; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, §§ 404.1-404.4.
1o Laws 1945, p. 678, H. B. 59; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 301a.
"lLaws 1945, p. 19, H. B. 687; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 5, § 48.
12 Laws 1945, p. 368, S. B. 107; I1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 16 , § 32.
18 Laws 1945, p. 754, H. B. 508; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 48, § 31.1 et seq.
14 Laws 1945, p. 814, H. B. 747; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 48, § 198.15.
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an unlicensed dairy plant.' 5 Amendment has also occurred in
the Narcotic Drug Act 16 by adding new compounds and increasing the penalty imposed where cannabis forms the basis of violation,17 and the proviso which heretofore limited the statute condemning crimes against children 18 has now been repealed. 19
In the field of criminal procedure a few cases are worthy of
some notice. While the statutory authority for impanelling a
special grand jury is limited ,to situations where the judge is of
the opinion that "public justice" requires it,20 it was deemed
sufficient to support the validity of the special grand jury called
in People v. Jameson 21 that the judge ordered the calling of, one
because the "public interest" made such necessary. The variation in language was treated as of no consequence especially
since the defendant made no challenge to the array nor moved to
22
quash the indictment but instead pleaded thereto.
Habitual Criminal acts have withstood assaults on constitutional grounds ever since the United States Supreme Court
endorsed the validity of the idea inherent in such laws. 23 The
Illinois statute has been likewise tested, 24 but new attacks are
made every year. Two such assaults on novel grounds were
made this past year but each failed to produce results. in
People v. Hanke 25 the claim was advanced that the local statute
operated as an ex post facto law against the particular defendant
since the original conviction which was made the basis of the
charge that he was an habitual offender had not been included
in the category of offenses calling for the more severe punishment at the time he was first sentenced although it had been
15 Laws 1945, p. 893, S. B. 184; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 56J, § 221 et seq.
16 Laws 1945, p. 684, H. B. 163; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 192.1 et seq.
17 Laws 1945, p. 686, S. B. 301; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 192.23.
is Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, § 109.
19 Laws 1945, p. 677, H. B. 384; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 109.
20 111. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 78, § 19.
21387 Ill. 367, 56 N. E. (2d) 790 (1944).
22 That a plea to an indictment waives all antecedent irregularities, see People v.
Gray, 261 Ill. 140, 103 N. E. 552, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1215 (1913).
23 McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 311, 21 S. Ct. 389, 45 L. Ed. 542 (1901).
24 Kelly v. People, 115 Ill. 583, 4 N. E. 644, 56 Am. Rep. 184 (1886).
25 389 Ill. 602, 60 N. E. (2d) 395 (1945).
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added before the second crime occurred. 26 In the other case,
that of People v. Lawrence,27 the claim of unconstitutionality
rested principally on the charge that the law amounted to an
attainder statute as it (1) tended to prejudice the accused when
before the jury, (2) laid an unequal hand on only certain persons,
and (3) condemned the accused without a judicial trial. Both
attacks failed when the court reannounced the fundamental
theory of the habitual criminal statutes, to-wit: the additional
punishment imposed is not assessed in retrospect for the prior
offense but is the just measure for the new one. When so
regarded, the statute clearly does not become either an ex post
facto law nor serve as a bill of attainder.
Although imposition of sentence in criminal cases is always
the function of the judge, the amount of the punishment may
sometimes be fixed by the court 2s and sometimes by the jury.
A change in the criminal code made by the legislature in 1943,
however, declared that in all cases not covered by the Sentence
and Parole Act 29 the jury shall assess the punishment unless the
accused pleads guilty.s0 That amendment, according to the
court in People v. Moore,8 1 has had the effect of repealing
specific provisions on the subject found in earlier acts so that,
regardless of the language thereof, imposition of punishment by
the court is erroneous in all cases where a jury is used. 2 Unless
this fact is borne in mind, confusion is likely to occur in the
future for a person examining a specific provision of the criminal
code covering a particular offense is not likely to have his attention drawn to the general provisions regarding punishment.
The use of habeas corpus proceedings to secure relief from
26 The first sentence, pronounced in 1940, was for rape. That offense was not
added to the list of habitual offenses until the following year: Laws 1941, Vol. I,
p. 573; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 602.
27 390 111. 499, 61 N. E. (2d) 361 (1945).
28 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 60.
29 Ibid., Ch. 38, § 801 et seq.
10 Laws 1943, Vol. I, p. 586; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 754a.
31324 Ill. App. 109, 57 N. E. (2d) 511 (1944).
22 The court noted that while Laws 1943, Vol. I, p. 586, S. B. 318, is printed in the
Ill. Rev. Stats. for 1943 and 1945 at Ch. 38, § 754a, no mention is made therein of
Laws 1943, Vol. I, p. 589, H. B. 342, which passed at the same session and which,
though generally similar, does not contain the specific provision involved.
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a criminal sentence is a legitimate way to raise questions concerning the validity of the judgment under which a person is
incarcerated. Such proceedings must be instituted in a state
court, however, even though the claim is made that federal
constitutional rights have been invaded. Recourse can be had
to federal courts only after all state remedies have been exhausted, including all appellate review permitted by state law. 33
It is not necessary, according to White v. Ragen,8 4 that certiorari
be obtained from the federal Supreme Court to review the state
court action before applying to the federal courts for relief, and
denial of certiorari by that court is not to be regarded as pre-cluding a lower federal court from inquiring into the matter.
The fact that the state supreme court refuses to exercise its
original jurisdiction over habeas corpus5 is not enough to
warrant a federal court taking over jurisdiction, judging from
the holding in United States v. Ragen,3 6 since other state tribunals have concurrent jurisdiction in such cases.3
Resort to
them is, therefore, necessary.
Judicial review of orders revoking probation granted to an
offender is contemplated by the statute but the same provision
directs that the several appellate courts are given jurisdiction
"finally to hear and determine" all such appeals.38 A writ of
error issued by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Kuduk 39
to review the action of the appellate court in such a case was
subsequently dismissed for the reason that jurisdiction in such
cases is confined solely to the intermediate tribunal.
Legislative attention to matters of procedure in criminal
cases has been confined to a change in the place of imprisonment
Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114, 64 S. Ct. 448, 88 L. Ed. 572 (1944).
U. S. -, 65 S. Ct. 978, 89 L. Ed. (adv.) 932 (1945).
35 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 2. The Illinois Supreme Court has indicated it would
not hear petitions which raise questions of fact only: People ex rel. Swolley v.
Ragen, 390 Ill. 106, 61 N. E. (2d) 248 (1945).
See also report of announcement
made by the court in conjunction with that case noted in - U. S. - at -, 65
S. Ct. 978 at 981, 89 L. Ed. (adv.) 932 at 935.
36 143 F. (2d) 774 (1944), reversing 52 F. Supp. 265 (1943).
37 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 65, § 2.
8s Ibid., Ch. 38, § 798.
39 388 Ill. 248, 57 N. E. (2d) 755 (1944).
33

34

-
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for persons guilty of maliciously destroying a building, 40 and to
a complete revision of the law concerning the business of giving
4
bail. '
V. FAMILY LAW.
Questions concerning the validity of marriages still come
before the courts. While a marriage procured by duress may be
annulled,' it appears from the holding in Smith v. Saum that
no sufficient ground for annulment will exist if the alleged duress
consists of an arrest and prosecution on a bastardly charge, provided such proceedings have not been maliciously instituted
without probable cause. The choice to marry in order to avoid
prosecution on the quasi-criminal charge cannot later' be rescinded in the absence of proof that the plaintiff was immature
and inexperiencedA Remarriage before a divorce has become
final, on the other hand, does present ground for annulment
since the allegedly divorced person lacks legal capacity to enter
4
into a second union until the decree of divorce is, in fact, signed.
An attempt by the second spouse of the allegedly divorced person, who had married him prior to presentation and signing of
the decree but after the court had indicated that a decree should
be prepared, to correct the record in the earlier divorce proceeding to which she was not a party by amending the same to show
that the decree had been entered nunc pro tunc as of a date prior
to the remarriage, was denied in Richmond v. Richmond.5 The
unfortunate but innocent supposed spouse learned, as have many
others, that it is wise to investigate before marrying, particularly
where it is claimed that an earlier marriage has been terminated
by divorce.
Matters concerning proof of divorce actions were involved
in three cases. In one of them, a rule of long standing of the
40

Laws 1945, p. 677, H. B. 385; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 425.

41 Laws 1945, p. 670, S. B. 543; I1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 627c et seq.
1 O'Brien v. Eustice, 298 Il1. App. 510, 19 N. E. (2d) 137 (1939).

2324 11. App. 299, 58 N. E. (2d) 248 (1944), noted in 23 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvIEw 346.
3 Thorne v. Farrar, 57 Wash. 441, 107 P. 347, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 385 (1910).
4 Moore v. Shook, 276 I1. 47, 114 N. E. 592 (1916).
5 326 Ill. App. 234, 61 N. E. (2d) 573 (1945).
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Circuit and the Superior Court of Cook County which required
the personal appearance in open court of the plaintiff was challenged.6 That rule was declared unconstitutional in Kinsley v.
Kinsley 7 on the ground that it imposed additional burdens upon
a litigant not contemplated by the statute regulating the trial of
divorce actions," hence wrought a change in the substantive law.
Not determined, because not involved, was the question of the
right to establish a divorce case by the use of depositions. 9 The
action taken in Church v. Church,10 however, would clearly seem
to violate the statute" for there a witness, minor child of the
parties, was privately interrogated by the judge in chambers with
the consent of and in the absence of the litigants or the court
reporter. Although the appellate court indicated the practice
was not to be commended, it indicated that because neither
special findings of fact or certificate of evidence are any longer
necessary 12 the absence of the testimony of the witness from
the record did not amount to error. In still another case, that
of Levy v. Levy,'3 the court rejected the idea that before a husband can obtain a divorce on the ground of cruelty he must
prove that he could not protect himself from violence by the
proper exercise of his marital powers. 14 The court indicated
that the divorce statute does not create a double standard, requiring one degree of cruelty to support a divorce complaint
by a husband and another and different degree if the plaintiff
is the wife, so that what would be "extreme and repeated
cruelty" as to one could be regarded as identically actionable
if offered to the other.
Maintenance of jurisdiction once acquired in divorce or sepa6 See Rule 60, § 4, Circuit Court of Cook County, effective January 1, 1934. The
Superior Court rule is identical. A discussion of the problem presented by such
rules may be found in 22 CI-ICAGO-KENT LAW REviEw 197.
7388 Ill. 194, 57 N. E. (2d) 449 (1944).
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 40, § 9.
9 On this point see 22 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEw 197, particularly pp. 199-201.
10324 Ill. App. 557, 58 N. E. (2d) 739 (1945).
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 40, § 9, requires that the witness testify in "open
court."
12 111. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, § 188(3).
's388 Ill. 179, 57 N. E. (2d) 366 (1944), reversing 320 InI. App. 608, 51 N. E. (2d)
829 (1943).
1.4That idea seems to have been first expressed in DeLaHay v. DeLaHay, 21 Ill.
252 (1859).
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rate maintenance proceedings has heretofore been possible by
the use of the writ ne exeat. 15 A novel twist was presented in
Kahn v. Kahn 16 where, upon suit for separate maintenance, the
court upheld an injunction restraining defendant from instituting marital proceedings in any court other than one in Illinois
although defendant had done no more than threatened to take
such action. 1 7 Equitable restraint upon a person's right to sue
in any court he might choose is rarely indulged in,' 8 but the
emigration of persons to states where at least a questionable
divorce can be obtained readily has forced recognition of the
fact that if some method is not utilized substantial rights may be
nullified. Had defendant begun proceedings elsewhere, the use
of injunction to restrain the further prosecution thereof would
not be unwarranted, 19 so extension thereof to situations like that
before the court is not unreasonable particularly since defendant
can secure all the relief he might need by counterclaim.
Two changes were made in the Divorce Act by the legislature. Venue may now be laid in either the county of plaintiff's
or of defendant's residence, 20 and the allowance of attorney's
fees may now run directly to the attorney and be enforced by
execution 21 instead of being made payable to the spouse. 2 2 Unwarranted appeals, however, cannot be made the basis of application for suit money and attorney's fees, according to Barton v.
Barton,23 for the court there reversed an order directing the
husband to pay the expenses of the wife on a petition for leave
to appeal from a determination dismissing a counterclaim for
separate maintenance for want of equity. 24 Although the statute
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 97, § 1 et seq.
16 325 Ill. App. 137, 59 N. E. (2d) 874 (1945).
17 DeRaay v. DeRaay, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 361, 255 App. Div. 544 (1938), holds that
injunction based on mere threat Is not warranted.
is Royal League v. Kavanagh, 233 Il1. 175, 84 N. E. 178 (1908).
19 See annotation in 128 A. L. R. 1449.
20 Laws 1945, p. 696, H. B. 460; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 40, § 6. Prior thereto,
action had to be instituted In the county of plaintiffs residence: Ill. Rev. Stat.
1943, Ch. 40, § 6.
21 Laws 1945, p. 694, S. B. 71; Il. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 40, § 16.
22 The former practice is illustrated by Anderson v. Steger, 173 Ill. 112, 50 N. E.
665 (1898).
23 323 Ill. App. 357, 55 N. E. (2d) 542 (1944).
24 See Barton v. Barton, 318 Ill. App. 68, 47 N. E. (2d) 496 (1943).
Leave to
appeal was denied.
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provides for such an allowance, 25 the granting thereof is discretionary and ought not to rest merely on an unverified petition 26 or be granted where the appeal is clearly without merit.
Issues involving the rights and obligations of infants have
also been presented for decision. The liability of a minor for a
tort committed by his agent was the subject of discussion recently in the case of Palmer v. Miller.27 At that time, the question of the minor's liability on the theory that, as he was present
and exercising control over the driver of the car at the time of
the collision, the driver's negligence might be imputed to him
was left undecided. New pleadings were presented in the case
upon remandment to frame an action on such theory and, upon
re-trial, a judgment was obtained by plaintiff. That judgment
was affirmed when the Appellate Court concluded that it was the
duty of the minor, being then present, to control the conduct of
the driver whom he had placed in charge of operating the automobile. 28 His failure so to do wag regarded as a tort on the
minor's part independent of any doctrines of agency law.
Rights of inheritance belonging to adopted children were
also considered. In one case, that of In re Tilliski's Estate,29
it was held that the adopted child does not lose the right to
inherit from its natural parents even though it acquires the
right so to do from the parents by adoption. 30 Acceptance of a
bequest or devise from the adopting parents prior to the death
of the natural parent in no way operates to change such rule.
In the other case, Belfield v. Findlay,1 it was declared that an
adopted child was not entitled to claim as a remainderman under
the will of the grandparent by adoption, even though the devise
was to go to the "children" of the named life-tenant, the adopting parent, since the majority of the court felt that term had to
be limited to the issue of the life-tenant. That result was
25 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 68, § 22. See also, as to divorce cases, Ch. 40, § 16.
26 Benham v. Benham, 107 Ill. App. 424 (1903).
27 380 Ill. 256, 43 N. E. (2d) 973 (1942), reversing 310 111. App. 582, 35 N. E. (2d)
104 (1941), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAw RLVIEw 195, 31 111. B. J. 355.
28 Palmer v. Miller, 323 Ill. App. 528, 56 N. E. (2d) 447 (1944).
29 Sub nom. Tilliski v. Martin, 390 Ill. 273, 61 N. E. (2d) 24 (1945), affirming
323 Ill. App. 490, 56 N. E.

(2d)

481 (1944).

30 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 3, § 165.
21389 Ill. 526, 60 N. E. (2d) 403 (1945).

Stone, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
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achieved, despite the doctrine that a testator is presumed to make
a will with knowledge of the existing law,82 on the ground that
the testatrix there concerned could not have contemplated the
adopted child as a potential devisee under the will inasmuch as
the will was made and the testatrix died before the adopted
child was born. The majority relied upon a general statement
that if the provision is for the children of some person other
than the testator the presumption is that an adopted child is
not to be included "unless there is language in the will, or there
are circumstances surrounding the testator at the time he made
the will, which make it clear that the adopted child was intended
to be included." 88 A vigorous dissent written by Justice Stone
criticized the holding of the majority by demonstrating that
earlier Illinois cases were distinguishable from the immediate
problem 84 and by noting that interpretation of the Massachusetts statute, from which the Illinois provision had been taken,
had reached a contrary result.8 8
Review of an adoption decree was denied to a natural parent
in Ekendahl v. Svolos 36 upon the ground that adoption proceedings are purely statutory in origin and, in the absence of statutory authority for appeal, a writ of error will not lie since no
question of property rights is involved. Following the decision
of that case, measures were introduced in the 64th General
Assembly to remedy an obvious defect in the law. Two such
measures were enacted. The first, amending Section 13 of the
former Adoption Act, 87 purported to permit any party to the
adoption proceeding to appeal from any final order in the method
provided by the Civil Practice Act. 88 Unfortunately, a complete
Munle v. Gruenewald, 289 Ill. 468, 124 N. E. 605 (1919).
33See annotation in 70 A. L. R. 621 to Mooney v. Tolles, 111 Conn. 1, 149 A. 515
(1930).
34 Moffet v. Cash, 346 Ill. 287, 178 N. E. 658 (1931) ; Smith v. Thomas, 317 Ill.
150, 147 N. E. 788 (1925) ; Wallace v. Noland, 246 Ill. 535, 92 N. E. 956, 138 Am. St.
Rep. 247 (1910), were cases in which there was evidence of intention to confine the
provisions of the will to blood relatives.
35 Sewall v. Roberts, 115 Mass. 262 (1874).
36388 Ill. 412, 58 N. E. (2d) 585 (1945), reversing In re Petition of Ekendahl,
321 Ill. App. 457, 53 N. E. (2d) 302 (1944), noted in 39 Ill. L. Rev. 88. A complete
discussion of the subject may be found in Zacharias, Judicial Review of Adoption
Decrees, 23 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REviEw 233 (1945).
37 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 4, §13.
38 Laws 1945, p. 16, H. B. 219.
32
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revision of the Adoption Act was also enacted at the same time,
so the old law was repealed almost as soon as it was amended.3 9
The new Adoption Act likewise purports to grant the right of
appeal to "any party to the proceeding who considers himself
aggrieved" by any such final order but limits the time for such
appeal to thirty days after the entry of the order appealed
from.40 On the basis that half a loaf is better than no bread at
all, the present statute represents an advantage over the situation disclosed to exist by the decision in the Ekendahl case. It
is far from adequate, however, since it will require judicial
construction to determine if a natural parent is a person "aggrieved," 41 and the time limitation is unreasonably short as
applied to a person presumably notified by publication, par42
ticularly if the notice is not, in fact, received.
VI. PROPERTY
REAL AND PERSONAL

PROPERTY

Perhaps the most troublesome decision handed down during
the past year is that of the Illinois Supreme Court in Corwin v.
Rheims.1 Should 'the court elect to maintain the position there
taken with respect to the application of the rule against perpetuities, the entire basis of contingent future interests in Illinois would seem to be threatened, both as contained in existing
instruments and those which may be created by draftsmen in the
future. The case involved the conveyance inter vivos to a trustee
of certain lots subject to a ninety-nine year lease, of which
approximately eight years had already run. Practically none
of the language of the trust instrument is set out in the opinion,
but certain of the provisions here pertinent were stated by the
'to Laws 1945, p. 16, S. B. 226; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 4, § 9-1.
40 Laws 1945, p. 16, S. B. 226; IlL. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 4, § 7-2.

41 To be "aggrieved," the person must usually show that the decree or judgment
operates on his property or bears directly on his interests: In re Everly's Estate,
322 Ill. App. 363, 54 N. E. (2d) 627,(1944), noted In 23 CHICAGo-KENT L&W RmvW
94. In the light of the attitude displayed by the Supreme Court in the Ekendahl
case, the term used could hardly be said to extend to the natural parent.
42 See 23 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEw. 233, particularly pp. 244-5. Compare with
draft of proposed statute noted there at pp. 248-9.
1 390 Il. 205, 61 N. B. (2d) 40 (1945). Gunn, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
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court to be that the trustee was empowered to collect the rents
and income from said property, deduct necessary expenses, and
distribute the balance in equal shares to three children; provided
that if any such child should die leaving lawful issue, the share
of such deceased child should go to such lawful issue in equal
shares and if any child should die without leaving lawful issue,
then such share should go to the surviving children of the
settlor; and that "in the event of the death of all three of said
beneficiaries, then the income of said property is to be divided
equally among the legal heirs of said beneficiaries by said trus2
tee or his successor."
The court held that the trust attempted no disposition of the
corpus of the estate but was confined to the income, stressed particularly the fact that the gift of the income to the three children
was not given to them as a class but as individuals, and pronounced the provisions as within the rule against perpetuities.
This holding is apparently based upon the assumption that the
trusts in favor of each child are to be treated as so utterly independent that only the life of that one child can be used for the
purpose of applying the rule. It is true, of course, as the court
points out, that more than twenty-one years might intervene
between the death of either of the children dying first and the
ultimate vesting in the "legal heirs" of the children upon the
death of the survivor of the children.
However independently the court might treat the interests of
the three children, it is difficult to understand how it could refuse
to use the "lives" of three named persons in being for the
purpose of determining whether or not the rule against perpetuities was violated.8 The court apparently conceded that the
"legal heirs" would be determined by the death of the survivor
2 390 Ill. 205 at 209, 61 N. E. (2d) 40 at 43.
3 Madison v. Larmon, 170 Ill. 65, 48 N. E. 556 (1897); Thellusson v. Woodford,

11 Ves. Jr. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1805); Re Villar, 1 Ch. (1929) 243; Fitchie v.
Brown, 211 U. S. 321, 29 S. Ct. 106, 53 L. Ed. 202 (1908). In the first case cited, the
Illinois Supreme Court quoted with approval the general rule laid down in Gray,
Rule Against Perpetuities, § 216, to the effect that "The contingency may be postponed for any number of lives, provided they are all in being when the contingent
interest is created; and the persons whose lives are taken need have no interest in
the estate."
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and the gift over then vested. Adequate analysis and discussion
of the opinion is beyond the scope of this survey, but it is rendered unnecessary by the existence of a very able comment by
4
Professor Schnebly of the University of Illinois Law School.
How the draftsman of trust instruments is to meet this situation does not appear. Some of the language of the majority
opinion would seem to suggest that the court might have held
otherwise had the gift to the three children been made to them
as a class. That would seem about the only precaution which a
draftsman could take without materially altering the actual
substance of the structure of the trust. The device employed in
the instant case, i. e., delaying vesting until the expiration of
several named lives in being is, of course, common practice and
one for which no adequate substitute is immediately apparent.
No substitute now devised can, of course, aid gifts contained in
trust instruments already in effect. It may well be that the
Supreme Court will have before it shortly, as a result of this
opinion, several bills for instructions by trustees and an opportunity to explain, limit, or repudiate the erroneous doctrine
seemingly laid down.
Other questions of property law have also been considered.
Ownership of land by an alien is subject to regulation by statute
in this state,5 one provision of which permits forfeiture of the
property unless the alien makes a bona fide transfer thereof
within six years of acquisition. 6 A proceeding in the nature of
office found was begun by a private citizen, in the case of People
ex rel. Kunstm'an v. Shinsaku Nagano,7 on the ground that the
alien there concerned had held land for more than six years after
acquisition and had then parted with the same merely by conveying the land to a trustee for the benefit of the alien. The
court, in an extensive and interesting opinion, discussed the
nature of the proceeding and concluded that the same could not
See 34 Il. B. J. 21 (1945).
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 6, §§ 1-7.
6 Ibid., § 2.
7 389 Il. 231, 59 N. E. (2d) 96 (1945), noted in 23 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW
330.
4
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be maintained by a private citizen,s hence found it unnecessary to
decide whether the transfer in question was a bona fide transfer
within the contemplation of the statute. There is cause to doubt,
however, whether a transfer in trust for an alien would be permitted to defeat the purpose of the statute and, in a proper proceeding, the beneficial interest, if not the fee title, to real property so transferred would very likely be forfeited.9
Maintenance of the essential four unities necessary to every
joint tenancy is just as requisite for the preservation of that
type of estate as is their presence at the time of its creation. If
any one or more of such unities be subsequently destroyed, the
title becomes translated into a tenancy in common. For these
reasons, it was claimed in Van Antwerp v. Horan 10 that levy
under an execution based upon a judgment against one joint
tenant operated to destroy the joint tenancy. Injunction restraining a sale upon such levy was affirmed therein when the court
concluded that (1) a mere levy does not destroy the unity of
since the debtor's title is not taken away prior to sale, and
title
(2) that
the unity of possession is not affected by the levy
as
the public official gains no right of possession to land merely by
levying thereon although a contrary result might follow had the
jointly-held property consisted of personalty. Death of the
judgment debtor after the levy and before further proceedings
were possible consequently resulted in the surviving joint tenant
being entitled to hold the entire property against the judgment
creditor as the right of survivorship had not been destroyed.
Left undetermined, because not involved, is the question whether
the sale on execution would destroy the unities or whether that
event would not occur until the redemption period had expired
been issued.'l
and deed of the debtor's interest had in fact
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 6, § 2, was declared unconstitutional to the extent that
it permitted a private citizen to sue after demabd on the proper public official because it undertook to deprive the Attorney General of powers vested in him by
Ill. Const. 1870, Art. V, § 1.
9 See discussion of this point in 23 CHICAGo-KENT LAW Ruwiw 330, particularly
pp. 333-4.
o390 Ill. 449, 61 N. E. (2d) 358 (1945).
11 By analogy to sales on foreclosure, It would seem that the debtor's title would
not cease until deed issued, Bradley v. Lightcap, 202 Ill. 154, 67 N. E. 45 (1903),
especially since a failure to apply for a deed in apt time, Ill. Rev. Stat.' 1945, Ch. 77,
§ 31, nullifies the sale.
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The interest in homestead conferred by statute 12 customarily
belongs to the head of the household and cannot be taken or sold
except on payment to him or her of the statutory allowance.'*
It has been said that, where title is held in joint tenancy between
a husband and wife, the homestead estate is vested in the spouses
jointly, 1 4 although no creditor may seize the homestead estate if
the spouses are living together unless the full statutory allowance
is given to the husband. 15 As between the spouses, however, the
case of Brod v. Brod 16 indicates that upon partition the husband
cannot compel the sale of the premises jointly held unless the
full homestead allowance is granted to the wife for the net result
of dividing the homestead between them would be the same as
selling the property without reference to the homestead. Since
the husband cannot compel the wife to relinquish her homestead
except by providing another suitable homestead for her, he must
set off to her the full value of the interest if he is unwilling to
provide a substitute.
Unusual indeed is the holding in Classen v. Heath 17 wherein
the Supreme Court indicated that a divorced spouse entitled to
claim dower 18 must assert the right to the same within the same
period and in the same fashion as is required of a surviving
spouse who prefers to reject the provisions of a will, or decline
a statutory share awarded to him or her as heir, and take the
common-law dower right instead.1 9 Although the statute expressly refers to the "surviving spouse," the language thereof
21
was interpreted to be applicable to the ex-spouse also.
Cases involving burial rights or interests in cemetery lots
seldom arise in this state, but occasionally some problem involvIl. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 52, § 1.
W3Diets v. Hagler, 309 Ill. 381, 141 ,N. E. 194 (1923).
14 Voss v. Rezgis, 343 Ill. 451, 175 N. E. 799 (1931).
15 Johnson v. Muntz, 364 I1. 482, 4 N. E. (2d) 826 (1936).
6 390 I1. 312, 61 N. E. (2d) 675 (1945).
17 389 Ii1. 183, 58 N. E. (2d) 889 (1945), noted in 23 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
313.
18 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 3, § 173, bars dower in case of divorce only to the
guilty spouse.
19 Ibid., § 171.
2o The phrase "husband or wife surviving," as used in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 52,
§ 2, dealing with homestead, has been held not to apply to divorced persons:
Krusemark v. Stroh, 385 Ill. 64, 52 N. E. (2d) 156 (1944).
12
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ing this specialized branch of law of property does get before
the courts. 2 ' In Goodman v. Independent Order Bickur Cholera
Ukadishu, 22 a widow sued to obtain an injunction against a
sectarian cemetery to restrain it from interfering with her right
to remove her deceased husband's body from a cemetery lot
and also from interfering with her right to sell such lot to a
third person. Injunction on the first point was upheld despite the
claim that, upon removal of the body, plaintiff would permit the
lot to deteriorate and would thereby cause the cemetery generally to depreciate, on the ground that there was no provision
in the deed or the cemetery by-laws requiring the owner to keep
up the property. It also appeared that all persons who would
have a right to protest against disinterment had consented to
the removal of the body. 23 The injunction was, however, vacated
on the second issue since plaintiff's right to sell the lot was
subject to a cemetery regulation that no owner could sell without
the specific consent of the cemetery authorities and such consent had not been obtained. The claim that such a regulation
was unreasonable and void because violating the right of free
alienation was rejected on the score that regulations of this
character rest upon another and different ground from that
which applies to ordinary land.2
Problems of conveyancing are generated when persons unskilled in the law attempt to draft deeds for they may be unfamiliar with such fundamental requirements as that, for ex25
ample, a conveyance to a person not in esse is necessarily void.
Such an inartificial deed was responsible for the litigation in
Pure Oil Company v. Bayler 26 where the grantor and his wife,
in consideration of "making support and maintenance provisions
for each," conveyed the premises to "the survivor in fee simple
forever survivor to dispose of they (sic) shall see fit to do."
21 Treatment of the entire subject may be found in Jackson, The Law of Cadavers
(Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1936).
22 326 Ill. App. 25, 60 N. E. (2d) 892 (1945).
23 On this point, see Jackson, op. cit., p. 104.
24 Rosehill Cemetery v. Hopkinson, 114 I1. 209, 29 N. E. 685 (1885).
25 Herrick v. Lain, 375 Ill. 569, 32 N. ID. (2d) 154 (1941).
26 388 Ill. 331, 58 N. E. (2d) 26 (1944), noted in 23 CHIOAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW
L. Rev. 154. Smith, J., took no part in the decision.
335, 40 Ill.
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Against the claim that such deed was void for want of a grantee,
it was urged that the intention of the owner-grantor must have
been to create a defeasible fee simple in the persons concerned by
the description of "the survivor."
The latter contention prevailed on the theory that the grantee need not be named if
he or she is described with sufficient certainty to distinguish him
or her from all other persons.
A deed is, of course, ineffective to convey the interest of a
grantor if not delivered during his lifetime,2 7 but. a question
would be apt to arise as to whether such deed would be effective
as to the other grantor when delivered. Such in fact was the
dispute involved in Creighton v. Elgin 2s together with the additional question as to whether the deed was sufficient to convey
only the interest held by the surviving grantor at the time of
its execution or carried the larger estate obtained by such grantor
in the interim between execution and delivery. The court held
that such deed was not rendered void by the death of one grantor
prior to delivery and also that it would serve to pass the interest
later acquired on the ground that a deed speaks only as of the
time of its delivery, regardless of its 'date.2 9 Reported cases
on these issues are extremely rare, hence the case would be noteworthy from that fact alone, 30 but it is also one of first impression
in this state.
Rights which may arise under an option to purchase real
estate were considered in Morris v. Goldthorp 31 where specific
performance was sought by an alleged vendee of land. It was
first contended that the supposed purchaser had translated an
ordinary option into a bilateral agreement by writing the word
"accepted" at the foot thereof. That contention was rejected
when the court indicated that it was as novel as it was unsound
27 Johnson v. Fulk, 282 Ill. 328, 118 N. E. 706 (1918).
28 387 Ill. 592, 56 N. E. (2d) 825 (1944), noted in 23 CHIOAao-KENT LAw REVIEW
263, 93 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 328.
29 Totten v .Totten, 294 Il. 70, 128 N. E. 295 (1920) ; Bearss v. Ford, 108 I1. 16
(1883).
30 The only known case identical on the facts is Schoenberger's Executors v. Zook,
34 Pa. St. 24 (1859).
31390 Ill. 186, 60 N. E. (2d) 857 (1945).
Thompson, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion.
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for the act of writing such word was no more than an acceptance
of the option for what it was, to-wit: a unilateral offer.3 2 It was
then urged that the vendee had subsequently accepted such offer
by a separate writing indicating a present intention to turn the
unilateral offer into a bilateral contract. Enclosed with such
writing was a warranty deed which vendee requested should be
signed by vendor. As the option was silent as to the type of
conveyance to be given and as a quit-claim deed is sufficient to
pass title, as the court ruled that the tender of a warranty deed
did not constitute an acceptance of the offer contained in the
option.3 4 Specific performance was, as a consequence, held properly denied.
But one case dealing with personal property doctrines is of
any importance. Minerals in situ are unquestionably real property but when severed from the land, even though left thereon,
they definitely become a form of personalty. The same rule
applies to top soil so that the same may become the subject of
a conversion.3 5 It was argued in Palumbo v. Harry M. Quinn,
Inc.,36 however, that if the top soil were permitted to remain on
the land from which it had been severed, even though piled up
thereon, until it became weed-grown it would then revert to its
original status, hence pass to a purchaser of the land. That
argument was deemed to be without merit on the facts of the
case since the purchaser of the land had notice at the time
that the top soil had been severed and piled by one who had
purchased the same for purpose of removal. In the absence of
any showing of intention to abandon the personal property thus
acquired,3 7 the top soil was held to retain its character of personalty and thus support an action for its conversion.
32 Keogh v. Peck, 316 Ill. 318, 147 N. E. 266, 38 A. L. R. 1151 (1925).
33 Butterfield v. Smith, 11 I1. 485 (1850).
24 Thompson, J., wrote a dissenting opinion in which he relied on Rohling v.
Thole, 256 Ill. 425, 100 N. E. 138 (1912), to show that the acceptance of the option
was unequivocal and the accompanying request for a warranty deed was surplusage
which could be disregarded.
35 Citizens Nat. Bank v. Joseph Kesl & Sons Co., 378 Il. 428, 38 N. E. (2d) 734
(1942), affirming 309 I1. App. 273, 33 N. E. (2d) 133 (1941), noted in 20 CHICAGOKENT LAW REVIEW 177.
28323 Ill. App. 404, 55 N. E. (2d) 825 (1944).
37 McGoon v. Ankeny, 11 Il1. 558 (1850).

SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-194-191,5

LANDLORD

AND

TENANT

Some cases dealing with the relationship of landlord and
tenant are also worthy of comment. In Metropolitan Trust Company v. Fishman," for example, a tenant under a lease granted
by a receiver claimed that his obligation to pay past due rent
was destroyed when, upon order of court, the lease was "cancelled" and his possession terminated, so that any suit for the
back rent had to be based on use and occupation, a claim which
would have been barred by the shorter statute of limitationsA
While such contention might have been sound had the lease been
rescinded, 40 the court held that the cancellation merely ended the
right of possession but left the obligation to pay the past due
The principle of Beach v.
rent in full force and effect.
4
1
Boettcher, to the effect that a lessee may defeat the lessor's
action for possession where it appears that the demised premises
have been sold for non-payment of taxes, was given a logical
extension in Wooster v. Scott 42 where the person in possession
was the lessee of the holder of the tax deed.
The operation and effect of wartime regulations on the rights
of landlord and tenant were before the court in Crosby v. BaronHout Oil Company 43 in which case the tenant sought relief
because a provision in the lease permitted termination whenever
"the use of said premises . . . be prevented, suspended or limited
It
Governmental action or law, or regulation."
. .
by any
was decided that such clause was sufficient to permit cancellation
because governmental regulation restricting the sale of tires,
tubes, gasoline and similar products had interfered with the
tenant's use of the demised premises. Not so successful, however, was the tenant in Moore v. Southern Independent Oil &
88323 Ill. App. 413, 55 N. E. (2d) 837 (1944), noted in 23 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REviw 191. Leave to appeal has been denied.
39 Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 83, § 16, with § 17.
40 United Wool Dyeing & Finishing Co. v. Werner & Co., 102 N. J. Eq. 322, 140 A.
465 (1928).
41323 Il. App. 79, 55 N. E. (2d) 104 (1944), noted in 23 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
REviEw 96. Leave to appeal denied.
42 326 Ill. App. 442, 62 N. E. (2d) 36 (1945).
43324 Ill. App. 651, 59 N. E. (2d) 520 (1945), noted in 23 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvoaw 337.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

Refining Company,44 where the lease contained a substantially
similar provision, because he had not taken advantage thereof
nor had he fully surrendered possession of the premises. Condemnation of the temporary use of demised premises, on the
other hand, will not excuse the tenant from his obligation to pay
rent, according to Leonard v. Autocar Sales & Service Company,45 even though the condemning authority obtains possession
of the entire premises with the right to extend that occupation
for additional yearly periods which might outlast the term. 4"
Eviction of tenants, other than for non-payment of rent, has
been drastically limited by rules promulgated by the Office of
Price Administration but subtenants are not entitled to the
7
benefit of such rules under the decision in Benson v. Williams.4
Refusal by the original tenant to execute a new lease, a ground
for eviction under such regulations, was considered in 222 East
Chestnut Street Corporation v. Murphy 48 as being justified because the lease tendered contained a standard clause for double
rent in case of delay in surrendering possession 49 even though
the actual refusal was predicated on a dispute as to the amount
of decorating to be done. As the local statute for double rent
is not abrogated but merely held in abeyance during the period
of federal regulation, the holding seems gratuitously to invalidate almost every existing apartment lease. Once a certificate
of eviction has been issued, it is not nullified by the fact that the
lessor has accepted rent after the expiration of the term so as
to create a renewal tenancy, although enforcement of rights
thereunder must await the expiration of the new tenancy. It is
no defense, under the ruling in Bochner v. Rosen,50 that the landlord has failed to obtain a second certificate for it was there held
44 326 Il. App. 11Z 61 N. E. (2d) 684 (1945).
It is understood that the decision
45 325 Ill. App. 375, 60 N. E. (2d) 457 (1945).
has been affirmed on certificate of importance.
48 An additional problem concerning the measure of damages to be awarded to the
tenant whose leasehold interest is only partly condemned, so as to leave him still
liable to pay rent, was presented in United States v. General Motors Corp., 323
U. S. 373, 65 S. Ct. 357, 89 L. Ed. (adv.) 379 (1945), modifying 104 F. (2d) 873
(1944), discussed ante, p. 29.
47 324 Ill. App. 580, 59 N. E. (2d) 29 (1945), abst. opin.
Leave to appeal has been denied.
48325 Ill. App. 392, 60 N. E. (2d) 450 (1945).
49 That clause is based on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 80, § 2.
50 326 Ill. App. 382, 62 N. E. (2d) 24 (1945).
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that the original certificate continued in effect unless or until
revoked by the renting authority.
SECURITY

TRANSACTIONS

It is customary, in bond-issue mortgages, to limit the right
to maintain foreclosure proceedings to the indenture trustee for
the benefit of the scattered bondholders. Such a provision, however, would ordinarily not prevent suit at law by an individual
bondholder upon his bond as he possesses two separate and
distinct rights.5 1 The latter right may be likewise restricted,
according to Gordon v. Conlon Corporation,52 so long as suitable
limitation appears in the bond itself. A restrictive provision
denying the right to sue at law, even after maturity of the
principal, unless a specified percentage of holders made demand
for such action, was there held valid. The inability of the bondholder to obtain the consent of the required percentage because
most other holders had joined in an extension agreement was not
regarded as sufficient to warrant a disregard of the plain language of the instrument.
While comment appears elsewhere on the decision in Naas v.
Peters,5 8 persons interested in mortgage law will readily recognize the distinction between the holding therein and that laid
down in the earlier case of Bride v. Stormner.54 An undisclosed
principal whose agent executes a mortgage can be held for a
deficiency arising thereunder only if it can be shown that the'
principal received the proceeds of the loan so as to support an
action in quasi-contract. No liability for the deficiency can be
enforced in the foreclosure proceeding since the statute applies
only to persons "liable for the mortgage debt." 15 On much the
same theory, corporate promoters were absolved from personal
liability upon a mortgage executed by the corporation in New
51 Rohrer v. Deatherage, 336 11. 450, 168 N. E. 266 (1929).
6 323 Il1. App. 380, 55 N. E. (2d) 821 (1944), noted in 23 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
REviEw 185.

58388 Il. 505, 58 N. E. (2d) 530 (1945), reversing 321 Ill. App. 212, 52 N. E.
(2d) 817 (1944), noted in 40 Il1. L. Rev. 133, and also noted ante, p. 10.
54 368 111. 524, 15 N. E. (2d) 282 (1938).
55 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 95, § 17.
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York Life Insurance Company v. 1325 Astor Street Building
5"
Corporation.
Mention was made last year of the decision of the Appellate
Court in Stevens v. Blue 57 which held that a senior mortgagee
could not have the benefit of a receivership obtained by a junior
encumberancer unless he secured an order extending such receivership. An order so extending the receivership to cover
the corpus of the mortgaged premises was there held inadequate
to preserve the rents arising therefrom even though such rents
had been pledged as additional security for the prior lien. Upon
leave to appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed on the
ground that the order extending the receivership should have
been given a more liberal construction so as not to deny to the
5
prior lienholder the rights accruing from his superior position. 8
While earlier efforts to revise the mortgage law of this state
failed to receive approval, 59 there is some indication that legislative interest in that direction has not become entirely extinct for
a committee has now been created to make a thorough study of
the entire subject and to report, with recommendations, to the
65th General Assembly.6" Other principles of law relating to
security have gone unchanged. 6 1
WILLS

AND

ADMINISTRATION

The fact that the Illinois Probate Act, effective January 1,
1940, recodified the law relating to wills and administration
serves to accelerate the flow of decisions in this field. Some
of the more significant are here mentioned.
56 325 Ill. App. 536, 60 N. E. (2d) 257 (1945). Leave to appeal has been denied.
57320 Ill. App. 375, 51 N. E. (2d) 603 (1943), noted in 23 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEw 57.
58388 Ill. 92, 57 N. E. (2d) 451 (1944), reversing 320 Il. App. 375, 51 N. E. (2d)
603 (1943).
59 See Crawford, Proposed Illinois Real Estate Mortgage Act, 19 CHICAGo-KENT
LAW REvIEw 141 (1941).
60 Laws 1945, p. 101, S. B. 664.
61 Attention is invited, however, to Commercial Credit Corporation v. 1-oran, 325
Ill. App. 625, 60 N. E. (2d) 763 (1945), discussed elsewhere, ante p. 14, dealing
with rights under a trust receipt transaction, and to Raymond v. Horan, 323 Ill.
App. 120, 55 N. E. (2d) 99 (1944), noted in 23 CHIOAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 194,
dealing with the use of a conditional sales contract as a substitute for a chattel
mortgage. The latter case, although technically within the period of this survey.
was discussed in the one for last year: 23 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 58-9.
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The problem word "or," for example, again received consideration in Hunsley v. Aull.6 2 The testator there gave a life
estate in certain lands to his widow and directed that "at the
death of my said wife . . . I give, devise and bequeath the
remainder of my said described real estate to my daughter ....
or her heirs, if she is not then surviving, to be her or their
absolute property forever." The court held the word "or" was
used in its ordinary disjunctive sense, and that the clause in question devised the fee to the daughter only if she survived the life
63
tenant.
In Winterland v. Winterland,6 4 the will directed that the share
given the son was to be held in trust and only the income paid to
him so long as he might live or until his present wife should have
died or became divorced, whereupon the principal of the estate
was to be paid to him as his absolute property. The condition
concerning divorce was held invalid as being against public policy
even though the son and his wife continued married and living
together until his death. The court, however, decided the gift
depended on two separate and independent conditions, one of
which was valid, so that the gift did not fail but passed over
upon the valid limitation, to-wit: that the son survived his wife,
which he did not do.
Another interesting case involving a latent ambiguity in the
65
language of a will may be found in Appleton v. Rea wherein
the testator devised "my brick building and ground upon which
it is situated in Lot 1" to a named devisee under one clause, and
by another clause gave "the two buildings which I own, and the
real estate upon which the same are situated on Lot 2" to another
person. In fact, Lot 1 was improved with a concrete structure
although two buildings, one frame and one brick, stood upon
Lot 2. It was held to be error to receive oral testimony as to the
2 387 Ill. 520, 56 N. E. (2d) 773 (1944).
Ill. 47.
63 The court distinguished the case from the holding in Boys v. Boys, 328
state, wherein the word "or"
159 N. E. 217 (1927), one of the leading cases in this
was construed to mean "and."
C4 389 Ill. 384, 59 N. E. (2d) 661 (1945), noted in 40 Ill. L. Rev. 127, 33 Ill. B. J.
311.
65 389 Ill. 222, 58 N. E. (2d) 854 (1945), noted in 33 IMi. B. J. 312. Thompson, J.,
dissented.
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testator 's intention that it was the brick structure which he had
sought to devise by the first clause, and ambiguity therein was
eliminated by the simple act of deleting the word "brick" from
the language thereof.0 6
In another will case, that of McNeilly v. Wylie,67 the will
devised one-half of the residue of the testatrix 's estate to her
brother, who was living at the time the will was made but who
predeceased her leaving children. The other one-half was devised to named devisees, the heirs of another brother previously
deceased. It was held that as a will speaks from the date of the
death of the testatrix and the devise to the living brother had
lapsed upon his death, the interest passed under the statute of
descent to the heirs of the testatrix as intestate property. The
heirs of both brothers were held entitled to share and the rule of
worthier title was not applied to defeat the entire residuary
clause on the ground that it made the same disposition as the
statute.
A question of lapsed legacies was before the court in Greene
v. Frank 68 where the testator bequeathed $1500 to each of his
two sisters, residents of Europe, but provided that if the executor
should be unable to pay the legacies on account of prevailing war
conditions or for any other cause, then the legacies should lapse
and become part of the residuary estate. The court, upon finding that the executor was unable to make payment to the sisters
because of the war, ordered the executor to pay the sums to the
residuary legatee rather than to hold the funds until normal conditions returned.
One other point as to the law of wills was settled in Spangler
v. Bell 69 where it was declared that the requisite formalities for
the execution of a will since the enactment of the Probate Act TO
are no different than those heretofore required by Section 2 of
the old Wills Act. 7 '
66 See Graves v. Rose, 246 Il. 76, 92 N. E. 601, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 303 (1910).
67 389 Il.

391, 59 N. E. (2d) 811 (1945).
6s 324 I1. App. 444, 58 N. E. (2d) 465 (1944).
09 390 I1. 152, 60 N. E. (2d) 864 (1945).
7O 11. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 3, §§ 193-4.
71 Iil. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 142, § 2.
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Several questions were presented involving problems of administration. The right to nominate or appoint an administrator
was discussed in three cases. In Dennis v. Dennis,2 a disinherited son who, in a spirit of reparation, had been willed the
entire estate of the mother but who was an inmate of the penitentiary was held entitled to nominate an administrator with the
will annexed for the mother's estate instead of a second son
who was the ultimate beneficiary under the father's will. The
decision was predicated largely upon the hostility and conflict
of interest between the brothers. It is surprising to notice that
nowhere in the opinion does the court refer to the last paragraph
of Section 96 of the Probate Act 73 which expressly declares
that only qualified persons shall have the right to nominate. As
the named executor was disqualified from acting by reason of
the penitentiary sentence, 4 he was likewise disqualified from
nominating an administrator with the will annexed.
Clear language in Section 271 and 274 of the Probate Act 75
was held sufficient, in In re Zverina's Estate,7 6 to support the
appointment of the Public Administrator to take charge of real
estate belonging to non-resident decedent, as against administrators appointed at the place of decedent's residence, particularly where claims against the estate have been filed by local
creditors. An order vacating such appointment was there reversed. The operation of Section 166 of the act 77 was properly
declared to be confined to cases where the non-resident left personalty within the jurisdiction. Only an "interested" person, such
as an heir or creditor, can object to the appointment of an administrator, so it was held in Lemmons v. Sims 78 that a debtor
of the estate had no such interest as would entitle him to raise
any objection. Moreover, an appointment once made is not subject to collateral attack in a subsequent action for wrongful
death under the holding of that case.
72 323 Ill. App. 328, 55 N. E. (2d) 527 (1944),
REvigw 266.
73 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 3, § 248.
74 Ibid., § 246.

75 Ibid., §§ 425 and 428.
76323 Ill. App. 585, 56 N. E. (2d) 471 (1944).
77 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 3, § 318.
78 326 Ill. App. 97, 61 N. E. (2d) 764 (1945).
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Arguments concerning the payment of legacies were involved
in Bauschkolb v. Ruediger 79 where the court reiterated the rule
that general assets of an estate are not subject to be taken for
the payment of specific legacies. It was also held that rents go
to the heirs who could not be compelled to return the same even
though it became necessary to sell the decedent's real estate.
For these reasons, it was determined that a direction in a will to
sell the testator's interest in certain realty and to pay, out of
the proceeds, specified amounts to designated persons created
legacies specific in character which abated ratably, did not draw
interest, and were chargeable with the expenses of sale.
Other minor issues of procedure were also decided. Although
Section 196 of the Probate ActS ° provides for the use of a
counterclaim by the estate against any claimant who presents a
claim, that provision was held to be permissive only and not
mandatory in First Trust & Savings Bank of Kankakee v. Powers.s ' The administrator may, therefore, bring an original suit
on the estate's demand against the creditor if he chooses so to
do. The rule has long existed that a probate court is without
82
jurisdiction in a citation proceeding to adjudge title to realty.
That doctrine has not been changed under the present Probate
84
that a determinaAct 83 so it was decided, in Moser v. Feciura,
tion in such a proceeding that the estate had no interest in certain
real estate was open to collateral attack. Also worthy of note is
the holding in Christensen v. Frankland85 to the effect that a
tort committed by the representative of an estate is perpetrated
by him as an individual and may not be sued therefor in his
representative capacity:
8 6 Another
One case affecting dower has been noted elsewhere.
79 325 Ill. App. 342, 60 N. E. (2d) 250 (1945).
so Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 3, § 348.
s 325 Ill. App. 600. 60 N. E. (2d) 582 (1945). Leave to appeal has been allowed.
82 Johnson v. Nelson, 341 Ill. 119, 173 N. E. 77. 88 A. L. R. 849 (1930).
83 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 3, § 335-6, are confined in operation to the discovery
or personal property or the "evidences . . . of title to lands."
84 324 Ill. App. 552, 58 N. E. (2d) 920 (1945).
s5 324 Ill. App. 391, 58 N. E. (2d) 289 (1944).
86 See discussion of Classen v. Heath, 389 Ill. 183, 58 N. E. (2d) 889 (1945), in
23 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 313, on the duty of an ex-spouse to assert claim
thereto within the time fixed by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. § 171.

SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1944-191,5

case of significance on the same subject is Ruwaldt v. W. C. McBride, Inc."7 The court there held that a widow was not required
to take out letters of administration and was not deprived of her
right of election because of delay in seeking administration, provided she made her election within the time fixed by law.8 Section
1 of the former Descent Act s9 failed to specify when dower had
to be asserted where no letters of administration had been issued.
The present law directs that the instrument electing dower must
be filed within ten months after death if no administration has
occurred, 90 and the fact that the widow has a right to apply for
letters 91 does not in any way affect her right to utilize the full
ten-month period.
92
The Illinois Supreme Court, by its decision in Lewis v. Hill,
has settled the principle that the conversion by conservator of an
insane person's realty into cash in order to provide support
does not work an ademption beyond the point necessary to meet
the needs of the ward. It has likewise been settled, in Ortman v.
Kane,98 that the conservator may do nothing which will operate
as a waiver or estoppel against the ward.

Statutory changes, all effective July 1, 1945, are not as numerous nor as important as in prior years. 9 4, Section 205 of the
act " has been amended by the addition of a new section which
authorizes the legal representative, unless otherwise directed by
the will or denied by law, to continue to operate the decedent's
87388 Ill. 285, 57 N. E. (2d) 863, 155 A. L. R. 1209 (1944).
8s The court, in its opinion, referred to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1935, Ch. 45, § 1.

This was
probably an error for Ch. 39, § 1, is the provision obviously intended.
89 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 39, § 1.
90 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 3, § 171.
9' Ibid., § 248.
92387 Ill. 542, 56 N. E. (2d) 619 (1944), noted in 23 CHIcAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
278, affirming 322 Ill. App. 68, 53 N. E. (2d) 736 (1944).
93 389 Ill. 613, 60 N. E. (2d) 93 (1945).
94 Miscellaneous changes have occurred in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 3, § 224.
dealing with depositions (Laws 1945, p. 1, H. B. 632); § 226, concerning proof
of handwriting (Laws 1945, p. 2, H. B. 3, and Laws 1945. p. 1, H. B. 632) ; § 241a,
validating prior recorded wills (Laws 1945, p. 9, S. B. 233) ; §§ 265, 279, and 280,
affecting appointment of conservators (Laws 1945, p. 4, H. B. 512) ; § 298a. concerning costs in certain guardianships (Laws 1945, p. S. H. B. 317) ; and in § 357,
regarding payment of claims (Laws 1945, p. 3, H. B. 476).
An entirely new
act, designed to protect the estates of persons declared missing in military service,
has been enacted: Laws 1945, p. 7, S. B. 393: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945. Ch. 3, § 521
et seq.
95 11. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 3, § 357.
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business for one month following the date of appointment, unless
otherwise directed by the court, without personal liability for
losses incurred except for those arising from malfeasance or misfeasance. Such operation may be continued for such further time
as the court might direct on proper petition. The provision
has no application, however, to corporations and partnerships
for it is limited to unincorporated businesses operated by the
decedent as a sole proprietor.9 6
Provisions for dispensing with administration of small estates
left by decedents have been amended so as to make it possible to
avoid expense in estates up to one thousand dollars 'I insteadof the maximum figure of five hundred dollars which was heretofore applicable.""
Titles to real property may be settled more readily by reason
of the amendment to Section 225 which now forbids the sale or
mortgage of a decedent's real estate more than seven years after
his death for the purpose of paying claims or administration
expenses. 99 Enlargement of that time is permitted only if the
petition is filed within the seven-year period. The statute is
made applicable to estates already probated, although the sevenyear period as to them is to be measured from the effective date
of the act. Claims already barred, however, are not revived.
The effect of the statute is to overcome certain judicial decisions
which have permitted sales many years after death, in one
instance as long as twenty years after. 10° Hereafter, the court
is deprived of discretion in the matter if creditors wait too
long, 10 1 hence prompt action on the part of the latter is not only
essential to preserve their rights but is also highly desirable.
Land titles ought not be held in abeyance while creditors speculate
on whether a sale of the decedent's realty should be forced or not.
s8 Laws

1945, p. 2, H. B. 476; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 3, § 366a.
Laws 1945, p. 6, H. B. 529; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945. Ch. 3, § 478.
98 111. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 478.
99 Laws 1945, p. 3, H. B. 654; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 3, § 379.
100 See People v. Lanham, 189 Ill. 326, 59 N. E. 610 (1901).
The former rule Is
restated in In re Bergman's Estate, 314 Ill. App. 154, 41 N. E. (2d) 115 (1942).
10, The same result has been reached on the ground of laches: In re Neff's Estate,
389 Ill. 625, 60 N. E. (2d) 204 (1945).
97
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TRUSTS

Only one case pertaining to the law of trusts seems to possess
significance. 10 2 In Pure Oil Company v. Byrnes, 103 the Supreme
Court declared that a lessee taking possession of land held by
tenants in common for the drilling of oil must disclose to a
co-tenant the existence of a producing well on the common property before taking a lease of the co-tenant's interest, particularly
where such co-tenant was unaware of the existence thereof.
Because the lessee there concerned had opportunity to make the
disclosure but did not do so, it was held that the lessee could
not claim it was a bona fide purchaser for value even though it
paid a third party for the lease. As a consequence, the lessee
was held to be a constructive trustee. The fiduciary relationship arose not merely from the fact that the lessee had become
a tenant in common, for that alone was insufficient. The circumstances of the negotiations, the lack of knowledge on the part of
the co-tenant, and the complete knowledge of all material facts
by the lessee all justified the finding.
Of utmost importance is the new statute which has adopted
the "prudent man" standard to guide trustees, no matter how
appointed, in the retention or making of investments of trust
funds. 10 4 While no deviation from the terms of the trust instrument is permitted to the trustee acting alone, the court is authorized, in proper cases, to permit deviation where necessary.0 5
Another statute permits the investment of proceeds arising from
eminent domain proceedings or partitions in other real estate by
the trustee appointed to receive the same subject to the control
of any court having equitable jurisdiction.1 0 6
102 Corwin v. Rheims, 390 Ill. 205, 61 N. E. (2d) 40 (1945), has already been
noted, ante p. 47. The problem inherent in the facts of People ex rel. Kun~tman
v. Shinsaku Nagano, 389 Ill. 231, 59 N. E. (2d) 96 (1945), noted in 23 CHICAGoKENT LAW REvIEW 330, should receive the consideration of a lawyer involved in
matters concerning trusts.
102388 Ill. 26, 57 N. E. (2d) 356 (1944).
104 Laws 1945, p. 1779, H. B. 280; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 148, § 32 et seq.
105 See an excellent discussion of the general problems Involved by Nylund, Investments by Trustees, 20 CHICAGo-KENT LAw REvIEw 331 (1942).
108 Laws 1945, p. 1780, H. B. 388; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 148, §34.
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VII. PUBLIC LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

The decision of the Appellate Court in People ex rel. Schutz v.
Thompson I invokes shades of the early Dental Examiner cases.2
Relator there sought to compel the Department of Registration
and Education to grant him access to the examination of candidates for licenses to practice medicine. His German license had
been cancelled after twenty years of practice "because he was a
non-Aryan." He presented to the Department his diploma as a
doctor of medicine from the University of Breslau, as well as a
copy of his license to practice. The Department denied him admission to the examination under a rule of long standing which
required applicants to "submit complete transcripts of medical
and premedical records with applications."
Compliance with
such rule was impossible because of chaotic conditions prevailing
in Europe, of the existence of which the court took judicial notice.
The lower court pronounced the rule of the Department unreasonable and granted mandamus. Its order was affirmed.
The general propriety of the holding would seem beyond question.8 It is not clear from the opinion, however, whether the
order of mandamus compelled the Department simply to consider
other evidence of qualifications or actually to admit relator to
the examinations. If the latter, it would seem that the court was
undertaking to resolve a matter entrusted to the Department.
Section 5a of the Medical Practice Act, 4 under which the relator
claimed to be qualified, requires that the medical school from
which applicant graduated must inter alia have been "reputable
and in good standing in the judgment of the department."
The
court said that from the record before it, "it must be assumed
that the colleges attended by the relator were reputable and in
1325 II. App. 95, 59 N. E. (2d) 494 (1945).
2 People ex rel. Sheppard v. Illinois State Bd.
(1884) ; Illinois State Bd. of Dental Examiners
227, 13 N. E. 201 (1887).
3 People v. Love, 298 Ill. 304, 131 N. E. 809
235, 123 N. E. 265 (1919) ; Kettles v. People, 221
4Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 91, § 5(1) (a).

of Dental Examiner, 110 Ill. 180
v. People ex rel. Cooper, 123 Ill.
(1921); People v. Kane, 288 Ill.
Ill. 221, 77 N. E. 472 (1906).
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good standing in the judgment of the department." 5 If such
assumption be well-founded, the decision would seem to be
brought within the doctrine of Illinois State Board of Dental Examiners v. People ex rel. Cooper,6 in which the petition alleged
that the college there in question "has been recognized by the
board of examiners as a reputable dental college and was so recognized when the relator presented his diploma." Otherwise, the
earlier case of People ex rel. Sheppard v. Illinois State Board of
Dental Examiners 7 would seem to control. The court, in that
case, sustained a demurrer to a petition which had alleged that
the college in question was reputable, rather than that the Board
had found it to be such.8
Another current decision involving abuse of administrative
discretion, this time reviewed by certiorari, was that of Northwestern Institute of Foot Surgery and Chiropody v. Thompson.9
The writ was issued to review the action of the Director of the
Department of Registration and Education in removing the Institute from the list of schools approved by the Department as
reputable and in good standing. The rules of the Department required a specified minimum number of doctors of medicine,
chiropodists, etc., on the faculty, and the complaint filed charged
that the teaching staff was not in accordance with these rules.
The complaint was heard before a "Special Chiropody Committee," upon the basis of whose recommendation the order under
review was made. That "committee" found, among other things,
that the Institute caused a catalog to be printed and presented
to the department as correctly setting forth the required number
of faculty members, and that the catalog was inaccurate and presented names of men who were not faculty members. The lower
court ordered the writ quashed, but the Appellate Court reversed
and ordered the return quashed for insufficiency. The court noted
5 325 Ill. App. 95 at 102, 59 N. E. (2d) 494 at 498.
6 123 Ii. 227, 13 N. E. 201 (1887).
7110 Ill. 180 (1884).
S The statement of facts in the instant case indicates that the petition merely
alleged that "the University of Breslau was a reputable medical college in good
standing" within the meaning of the act: 325 Ill. App. 95 at 97, 59 N. E. (2d)
494 at 496.
9326 Ill.
App. 439, 62 N. E. (2d) 42 (1945).
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the total absence of facts to support the finding, characterized the
finding as a mere "conclusion," and stated that the Institute was
entitled to know specifically wherein it had failed to meet the
requirements of the Department. The decision seems clearly
correct. To have held otherwise would have been to make review
by certiorari an illusory remedy.
Attention is also invited to the new Administrative Review
Act,' 0 prescribing a uniform method for review of administrative
decisions. The act provides for review by Circuit and Superior
Courts which shall "extend to all questions of law and fact presented by the entire record before the court."
It applies to
judicial review of proceedings instituted after January 1, 1946,
but then only to review the final decisions of any administrative
agency where the act creating or conferring power on such
agency, by express reference, adopts the provisions of the new
statute. Where applicable, such review is exclusive. The act has
already been made applicable, by such express reference, to more
than forty different types of proceedings and is evidently intended to provide a uniform method of reviewing miscellaneous
administrative decisions. The provision for judicial review of
the facts, if it be understood literally, is revolutionary, and would,
if so interpreted, jeopardize the validity of the act as applied
to certain types of proceedings. It seems possible that the Supreme Court will interpret the provision as allowing substantially
the scope of review permissible on certiorari. Not only would
this obviate the attempt to confer non-judicial functions on the
courts, but it would tend to preserve the prestige of administrative bodies and the integrity of the administrative process.
CONFLICTS OF LAWS

The only case of local significance in the field of conflicts of
laws is that of Moscov v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of
New York" wherein the Illinois Supreme Court apparently has
had its first occasion to apply the 1939 statute calling for uniform
iOLaws 1945, p. 1144, S. B. 117; Inl. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 110, §§264-279.
11387 Ill. 378, 56 N. E. (2d) 399 (1944).
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judicial notice of foreign laws. 12 The court not only gave full
effect to the statute by taking judicial notice of the law of Pennsylvania, but also overruled its own decision in Royal League v.
Kavanagh 18 in order to follow a decision from an inferior court
in Pennsylvania. 1 4 In the earlier Illinois case, the court had
enunciated the rule that the courts of this state should presume
that the common law of a sister state is the same as that of Illinois in the absence of a decision to the contrary from a court of
last resort in such sister state.' 5
The new rule laid down by the Supreme Court, to-wit: that it
will follow decisions of courts of sister states inferior to the
courts of last resort in determining matters of foreign law seems
desirable and in general preferable to indulging in the commonlaw presumption. It is rather difficult to understand, however,
why the court attributed its change of position to the 1939 statute.
That act would seem merely to determine how the law of a sister
state should be brought into the proceeding, that is as law rather
than as fact. It makes no provision nor purports to effect any
change with respect to the type of legislative or judicial act which
shall constitute the "law" of a sister state. It is possible that
the court was influenced by a changed attitude on the part of the
federal courts 16 since the decision in Erie Railroad Company v.
Tompkins 17 for it quoted with approval from another Federal
Supreme Court case to the effect that where an intermediate
appellate state court rests its considered judgment upon the rule
of law which it announces, that is "a datum for ascertaining state
law which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is
convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the
state would decide otherwise." ' 8
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 51, §§ 48g-48n.
13 233 Ill. 175, 84 N. E. 178 (1908).
14 Farmers Trust Co. v. Reliance Life Ins. Co., 140 Pa. Super. 115, 13 A. (2d)
12

111 (1940).

15 It was there declared that "this court cannot, in advance of its announcement by the Supreme Court of Missouri, assume that the common law in that
State will be declared to be different from the common law as construed in this
State." 233 Ill. 175 at 184, 84 N. E. 178 at 181.
16 See annotation in 132 A. L. R. 964 (1940).
'7304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938).
18 West v. American Telep. & Teleg. Co., 311 U. S. 223 at 237, 61 S. Ct. 179 at 183,
85 L. Ed. 139 at 144 (1940).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Three statutes failed to meet constitutional tests when subjected to judicial scrutiny during the past year. In McDougall
v. Lueder,1 9 although the court sustained the general validity of
the Community Currency Exchange Act, 20 it invalidated one pro-

vision thereof for being so indefinite as to confer upon the Auditor of Public Accounts "arbitrary, unlimited and unrestrained
power." 21 Other objections to the effect that by excepting certain express and telegraph companies an unreasonable classification had been developed; 22 that prohibiting exchanges from accepting deposits amounted to a denial of equal protection; 23 and
that there had been an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power, 2 4 were overruled.
The Professional Engineering Act 25 was invalidated in Krebs
v. Thompson 26 because the definition of "professional engineering" was found to be so inadequate that the determination as to
just who was engaged in that occupation was, in fact, left to the
unguided judgment of the Department of Registration and Education, thereby involving an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to an administrative officer. A more specific definition for the phrase "professional engineering" was written into
27
the new act adopted at the last session of the legislature.
In the third instance, that of People ex rel. Gallenbach v.
Franklin,2s the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated a 1943 statute
19389 Ill. 141, 58 N. E. (2d) 899 (1945).
20 Laws 1943, Vol. 1, p. 233; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 16J, § 31 et seq.
21 Subsection (c) of Section 4, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 16, § 34(c), required an

application for a license to do business to contain "such other Information as the
Auditor may require." As amended by Laws 1945, p. 367, S. B. 106, Ill. Rev. Stat.
1945, Ch. 161, § 34(c), the requirement is now much more specific.
22 The court held the classification reasonable on the ground that the act was
intended to regulate only companies of a purely local character.
23 This provision

was deemed reasonable because it prevented such exchanges

from engaging in the banking business without being subject to the special regulations and responsibilities attendant thereto.
24 The court found that sufficient standards were enunciated in the act itself to
control the discretion delegated to the Auditor to supervise its operation or to
promulgate rules thereunder.
25 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 443; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 482, § 1 et seq.
26387 Ill. 471, 56 N. E. (2d) 761 (1944).
27 Laws 1945, p. 844, H. B. 337; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 484, §§ 32-61.
28388 Ill. 560, 58 N. E. (2d) 555 (1945).
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designed to provide for the creation and maintenance of a fireman's annuity and benefit fund for municipalities of 10,000 to
100,000 inhabitants.2 9 Violation of the state constitution was
said to have occurred because the act attempted to grant the
3ower to assess and collect taxes to persons who were not the
,orporate authorities of the municipalities involved.3 0 The aniuity and benefit funds were to have been raised by salary deluctions and by contributions from taxes levied in such cities.
rhe amounts to be paid by the cities were to be determined by
'3 2
31
icts of local Retirement Boards, by the "annual convention
ind by the Supervisory Board.3 3 The court obseryed, when invalidating the act, that the "power to create a debt to be dis,harged by taxation is substantially the same thing as the power
34
;o impose a tax."
Two federal cases involving questions of admission to the
iractice of law in Illinois may be noticed briefly. Brents v.
Stone3 5 is of interest because of the bizarre nature of the suit
rather than by reason of legal significance. An action for decla;ory judgment was there instituted against the justices of the
Supreme Court of Illinois to obtain a decision that the rules
idopted by the court governing admission to the bar deprived
)laintiff of the right to practice law, said to be a privilege guarmnteed and protected by the federal constitution. Plaintiff did
iot aver that he had requested or been denied the right to take
-he bar examination, but merely that he had applied to the Supreme Court for admission, presenting a certificate of good
noral character, and had been refused admission. The district
,ourt, observing that a license to practice law is not a privilege
;vithin the purview of any constitutional provision, 6 sustained
Laws 1943, Vol. 1, p. 327; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24, § 944.66 et seq.
so See Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IX, § 9.
31 Such boards were to consist of the mayor, the city treasurer, and three fireen.82
Attended by one delegate, a fireman, elected by each local
Retirement Board.
as Elected by the annual convention.
84 388 Ill. 560 at 575, 58 N. E. (2d) 555 at 562.
8560 F. Supp. 82 (1945).
as Citing, among other decisions, Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U. S. (16 Wall.) 130,
I1 L. Ed. 442 (1873).
29
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a motion to dismiss the complaint because it was a suit against
the state in violation of the Eleventh Amendment.
The decision in In re Summers3 7 is much more significant.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorai to review
the action of the Illinois Supreme Court in denying petitioner's
prayer for admission to practice in Illinois, which denial was
said to be predicated on the sole ground that he was a conscientious objector to war. Although the petitioner had successfully
passed the bar examination, he had been denied the requisite
certificate of good moral character.3 8 The Illinois court likewise denied d petition for admission, sustaining the opinion of
the Committee on Character and Fitness. With four justices
dissenting, the United States Supreme Court affirmed that action.
Petitioner contended that his exclusion from the bar amounted
to a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, insofar as that clause protected him against state
action in violation of the principles of the First Amendment.3
Without indicating to what extent, if at all, the First Amendment is applicable to state action, the court assumed that an
attempt to exclude members of a religious group from the practice of law, merely because they were such, would be unconstitutional. It can be inferred, however, that the court was thinking in terms of the "equal protection" rather than the "due
process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for it said:
"We cannot say that any such purpose to discriminate moti37-

U. S.-,

65 S. Ct. 274, 89 L. Ed. (adv.) 1304 (1945).

38 The secretary of the Committee on Character and Fitness had embodied his

views in an unofficial letter, reading in part as follows: "I think the record
establishes that you are a conscientious objector-also that your philosophical
beliefs go further. You eschew the use of force regardless of circumstances but
the law which you profess to embrace and which you teach and would practice
It is real. It Is the
is not an abstraction observed through mutual respect.
result of experience of man in an imperfect world, necessary we believe to
restrain the strong and protect the weak. It recognizes the right even of the
individual to use force under certain circumstances and commands the use of
force too obtain its observance . . . I do not argue against your religious beliefs
or your philosophy of nonviolence. My point is merely that your position seems
inconsistent with the obligations of an attorney at law."
39 U. S. Const., Amend. I, declares: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "
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vated the action of the Illinois Supreme Court. "40
The court
also referred to the fact that Illinois has a constitutional provision which requires service in the militia in time of war of
men of the petitioner's age group, 41 and noted that the United
States denies citizenship to aliens who refuse to pledge military
service. 42 From these facts, the majority concluded that insistence that an officer charged with the administration of justice
take an oath to support the state constitution and indicate a
willingness to perform military service did not violate principles of religious freedom.
Mr. Justice Black, in a dissenting opinion, stated that "if
Illinois can bar this petitioner from the practice of law it can
bar every person from every public occupation solely because
he believes in non-resistance rather than force." ' 43 Decrying
the use of the test oath, he relied on dissenting opinions in
United States v. Schwimmer 44 and United States v. Macintosh.45
It was in the second of these cases that the power of the United
States to draft conscientious objectors for military duty and to
punish them for a refusal to serve as soldiers was recognized,
although the case actually involved a denial of naturalization
to one who refused to take an oath to bear arms.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

Cases which may have far-reaching consequences in the field
of municipal law were passed upon during the judicial year just
closed. They deal, however, with a wide variety of topics.
Thus, the validity of a lease of a portion of public lands was
46
involved in Lincoln Park Traps v. Chicago Park Distridt.
The lessee, a private club, there sought injunction to prevent a
forfeiture of the lease and a threatened ouster, claiming that
(a) the lease was valid and enforcible, or (b) if not, that estopU. S. - at -, 65 S. Ct. 274, 89 L. Ed. (adv.) 1304 at 1310.
41 11. Const. 1870, Art. XII, § 1. But see also Art. XII, § 6.
42 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644, 49 S. Ct. 448, 73 L. Ed. 889 (1929);
United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S.605, 51 St. Ct. 570, 75 L. Ed. 1302 (1931).
43U. S. - at -, 65 S. Ct. 274, 89 L. Ed. (adv.) 1304 at 1312.
44 279 U. S. 644 at 653, 49 S. Ct. 448 at 451, 73 L. Ed. 889 at 893.
45 283 U. S.605 at 627, 51 S. Ct. 570 at 576, 75 L. Ed. 1302 at 1311.
46 323 I1. App. 107, 55 N. E. (2d) 173 (1944).
4o_

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

pel prevented a forfeiture because of expenditures made for
valuable improvements in reliance on the lease. The court determined that it was error to grant an injunction because public
grounds could not be leased to private individuals, 4 7 and the
doctrine of estoppel had no application to the exercise of gov48
ernmental functions.
An interesting case concerning the tort liability of a municipality may be found in Pickett v. City of Hillsboro49 where a
demented park concessionaire shot and killed a yound lad while
he was swimming in a municipal pool. Recovery for the wrongful death was denied on the theory that the operation and maintenance of a public park amounted to a governmental function.
One count in the complaint, however, charged that the city was
maintaining a dangerous nuisance in permitting the concessionaire to remain on the premises. Although the court denied
that the facts constituted an actionable nuisance in the light of
5" the soundness of
the holding in Craig v. City of Charleston,
the opinion in this respect may be open to question.
The right of a de jure civil service employee to recover his
full salary accruing in the interim between the issuance of a
peremptory writ of mandamus and the time when the same was
affirmed on appeal was vindicated in Corbett v. City of Chicago.51 Despite the fact that the city had paid the salary to a
de facto employee who had performed the services, and despite
the fact that it claimed that to permit recovery would penalize
it for having taken an appeal, it was held that only by granting
recovery could the right of the civil service employee be properly protected.
McPike v. Illinois Terminal R. Co., 305 Ill. 298, 137 N. E. 235 (1922).
Estoppel was also urged, in Newberry Library v. Board of Education, 390 Ill.
48, 60 N. E. (2d) 552 (1945), as a ground for preventing the municipal corporation
there concerned from protesting the validity of certain refunaing bonds. The
estoppel was said to rest in certain recitals contained in such bonds. The court
held that total lack of power could not be remedied by any recital of the existence
thereof.
49 323 Ill. App. 235, 55 N. E. (2d) 306 (1944).
50 180 Ill. 154; 54 N. E. 184 (1899), affirming 78 Ill. App. 312 (1898).
51323 Ill. App. 429, 55 N. E. (2d) 717 (1944), noted In 23 CHICAGo-KENT LAw
REvIrEw 268. On leave to appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the holding:
391 Ill. 96, 62 N. E. (2d) 693 (1945), not in the period of this survey.
47
48
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Questions arising under zoning ordinances also reached the
reviewing courts. In Salem v. Hogan,52 the county ordinance
permitted a "picnic grove" in a restricted area while forbidding any "regular business development." Certiorari was denied
to a farmer -who had converted a barn into a recreational center
because the court concluded that the premises, as so converted,
were more than just a picnic grove. Douglas v. Village of
5" involved the point as to whether
Melrose Park
or not a nonconforming use had been discontinued so as to prevent a renewal
thereof. A small factory had there been vacant for some time
while the owner was trying to locate a suitable tenant. The
court held that the word "discontinued," as used in the ordinance,, was the equivalent to "abandoned," hence involved elements of intention as well as of cessation of use. As the owner
had no such intention to discontinue, injunction to prevent the
interference with a renewal of the use was granted. The third
significant case was that of Mercer Lumber Companies v. Village
of Glencoe.54 It was there held proper for a municipality to
place limitations upon the extent to which alterations or additions might be made to non-conforming uses in the interest of
5
producing their eventual extinction. Lee v. City of Chicago"
illustrates how a valid general zoning ordinance may be made to
operate so unreasonably in a given situation as to warrant
an injunction against its enforcement. The plaintiff there desired to erect a theater in a commercial zone but was denied a
permit because the building would be within a prohibited distance from a seminary or "building used exclusively for educational purposes." When plaintiff showed that there were many
taverns located much closer, so that the purpose of the ordi5 6
nance had failed, the court granted injunction.
Licensing powers were involved in two cases. Section 23-75
52 323 Ill. App. 558, 56 N. E. (2d) 663 (1944).
a8 389 Ill. 98, 58 N. E. (2d) 864 (1945).
54 390 Ill. 138, 60 N. E. (2d) 913 (1945), noted in 23 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REviEw

349.
55 390 Ill. 306, 61 N. E. (2d) 367 (1945).
56 The court said: "Merely because the property is within the letter of the ordinance does not mean that it is still to be enforced even though the situation is
outside the purpose of the law." 390 Ill. 306 at 311, 61 N. E. (2d) 367 at 369.
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of the Cities and Villages Act 57 empowers municipalities to
regulate and prevent the storage of "turpentine, tar, pitch,
resin" and other similar combustibles or explosive materials.
The section was held sufficiently broad, in Edward R. Bacon
Grain Company v. City of Chicago,55 to sustain an ordinance
providing for the licensing and inspection of grain elevators
at a substantial fee as being necessary to protect the city against
fire hazard. There was no indication, though, as to how the
payment of the large fee would accomplish that purpose. On the
other hand, it was held in Arnold v. City of Chicago5 9 that the
statute permitting the regulation of the business of moneychanging" was not broad enough to permit a city to license
currency exchanges.
A municipal ordinance of Kankakee declared it to be a public
nuisance for any person to allow the emission of "dense smoke"
except for periods aggregating six minutes in any one hour.
By that ordinance, the building inspector was authorized to
"summarily abate" any condition constituting a violation
thereof. The lack of adequate standards together with the arbitrary basis for administrative action justified the decision in
City of Kankakee v. New York Central Railroad Company6 1 that
such ordinance was invalid.
Several statutes purporting to vest additional powers in
municipal governments were tested on constitutional grounds.
The Municipal Airport Act 6 2 was declared invalid in People ex
rel. Greening v. Barthol6 because it vested taxing powers in
the hands of others than the representatives of the persons to
be taxed in violation of Section 9 of Article IX of the state constitution.6 4 Similar criticism was also successfully directed
against a statute creating a fireman's annuity and benefit fund
Ch. 24, § 23--75.
58 325 Ill. App. 245, 59 N. E. (2d) 689 (1945).
59 387 II. 532, 56 N. E. (2d) 795 (1944).
60 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 24, § 23-91.
a1387 Ill. 109, 55 N. E. (2d) 87 (1944).
62 Laws 1943, Vol. 1, p. 212; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 15J, § 49 et seq.
63 388 Ill. 445, 58 N. E. (2d) 172 (1944), noted in 39 Ill. L. Rev. 413.
64 The legislature subsequently adopted a new statute on the subject: Laws o
1945, p. 290, S. B. 10; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 15J, § 68.1 et seq.
57 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945.
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in cities with a population in excess of 10,000 but under 100,000
in population.6 5 Of larger social interest, however, was the outcome of the attack on the Neighborhood Redevelopment Law 8
made in the case of Zurn v. City of Chicago.7 That portion of
the statute which permitted the condemnation of private property for housing projects received the brunt of the criticism
but the statute was upheld when the court observed that this
had been declared to be a public purpose by the legislature and
the judicial department would not inquire into the propriety
6 8
of that declaration.
A novel problem of workmen's compensation for municipal
employees was presented in City of' Chicago v. Industrial Commission.69 A clerk of election had received an injury to his eye
while performing his functions. Claim for compensation was
contested on the ground that injury was not compensable or,
if it was, that the burden fell upon either the election board or
the county government rather than on the city. Compensation
was upheld and the burden thereof was placed on the city on
the theory that although the injured person was hired by the
election board he was really the employee of the city for which
the duties were performed. There is doubt about the validity
of such reasoning.7 0
PUBLIC

UTILITIES

The Illinois Supreme Court has handed down two decisions
affirming in strong language the principle of segregation of suburban operations of an interstate carrier for rate-making purposes. In one of them, that of Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois Commerce Commission,71 the Supreme Court
65 People ex rel. Gallenbach v. Franklin, 388 Ill. 560, 58 N. E. (2d) 555 (1945).
The statute concerned was Laws 1943, Vol. 1, p. 327; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 24,
§ 944.66 et seq.
66 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 431; Il1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 32, § 550.1 et seq.
7 389 Ii. 114, 59 N. E. (2d) 18 (1945), noted in 39 Il1. L. Rev. 338.
60 Murphy, J., dissented on the basis of generally accepted views as to what
constituted a "public purpose" in matters of eminent domain.
69 389 Ill. 411, 59 N. E. (2d) 805 (1945).
70 See Esling, The Relationship Between Municipal Employment and Workmen's Compensation, 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW RLvnw 209 (1943).
71387 Ill. 256, 56 N. E. (2d) 432 (1944), noted in 33 Ill. B. J. 236.
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affirmed a decision of the Superior Court of Cook County setting
aside an order of the Illinois Commerce Commission denying
proposed increases in suburban rates. The railroad had filed
proposed tariffs back in 1925 for a twenty per cent. increase in
suburban intrastate rates to correspond with a similar increase
granted railroads generally on interstate traffic. The state commission denied the proposed increase, although it did grant one
for fifteen per cent. The railroad then obtained a federal injunction, in 1928, against interference with its plans and, under
the protection thereof, put the proposed rate increase into
Thereafter, the Interstate Commerce Commission
effect.
granted another general increase of ten per cent. to railroads
throughout the country and the company filed suburban tariffs
setting forth such increase. The state commission suspended
them as it did similar tariffs of other roads. One of the other
roads enjoined state action on the ground that the order of the
federal commission had superseded the jurisdiction of the state
body. On appeal therefrom, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the Interstate Commerce order did not apply
to intrastate commutation rates in the Chicago area.7 2 In the
meantime, the suspension order of the Illinois commission had
been appealed to the Superior Court of Cook County and there
had been set aside. Appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court followed with the result indicated.
In passing upon the questions raised by the appeal, the court
held that the railroad was not required to give notice to the
Federal Emergency Price Administrator because the proceedings were instituted, the taking of evidence concluded, and the
case taken by the commission before the provisions of the
Emergency Price Control Act requiring such notice had become
effective and that statute was not retroactive. It also held that,
as the railroad had voluntarily reduced its rates in 1936, it had
thereby abandoned the maximum rates originally fixed by the
permanent injunction in 1928, inasmuch as an injunction does
72 See Illinois Commerce Commission v. Thomson, 318 U. S. 675, 63 S. Ct. 834,
87 L. Ed. 1075 (1943).
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not create but merely protects rights and is always subject to
adaptation as events reqiuire.
Upon consideration of the question of whether or not the
commission's order was unreasonable or unlawful, the Illinois
Supreme Court scrutinized the evidence, all of which was
offered by the railroad, and concluded that the commission was
fundamentally wrong as a matter of law in refusing to consider
the suburban service of the road as separate from the system
service. 73 Having concluded that the commission disregarded
a fundamental rule of law by wrongfully refusing to consider
the evidence showing the suburban service to be segregated and
separate from system service, it followed that the finding that,
as the entire system's net revenue provided a reasonable return
on the system investment, it was immaterial whether the revenue
derived from suburban service was sufficient to pay operating
expenses or a fair return on the reasonable value of the property devoted to such service, was clearly against the weight of
the evidence. As a consequence, the order of the commission
could not be sustained.
Fleming v. Illinois Commerce CoMnmission 4 was the other
case involving the fixing of suburban rates. Several railroads
had appealed from orders of the Illinois Commerce Commission denying their proposed increases in suburban rates. In
each case, the Circuit Court of Cook County had affirmed the
commission's action. Appeals taken to the Supreme Court were
consolidated and that court reversed and remanded as to all the
railroads except one. The court carefully considered the evidence as to the character of the suburban service rendered by
the-successful appellants, the substantial deficit in income from
that service, the apportionment of expense to and the value of
the facilities used in such suburban service and, following the
same reasoning as in the Illinois Central rate case previously
mentioned, held thatfthe commission's orders could not be sus73 The court cited Northern Pacific R. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585, 35
S. Ct. 429, 59 L. Ed. 735 (1915), among other cases, and also the famous Smyth
v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 S. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed. 819 (1898), on the question of
segregation of services by a carrier in relation to values.
74388 Ill. 138, 57 N. E. (2d) 384 (1944).

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

tained. The unsuccessful appellant was primarily a terminal
company, the evidence as to it substafitially supported the finding of the commission, and because it had not met the burden
of showing that the proposed rates were not unreasonable, the
order as to it was affirmed.
The necessity of notice to the Office of Price Administration
was also raised in Pullman Company v. Illinois Commerce Commission.75 That company had filed schedules of proposed increases in rates to go into effect on April 25, 1942, and later.
The new rates were suspended by the commission for successive
periods although hearings were held. Before the expiration of
the last suspension, an order was entered which found the proposed increases unlawful and required the proposed tariffs to
be cancelled. That order stated that the carrier had failed to
give requisite notice to the Office of Price Administration of the
intention to increase the rates and to consent to timely invervention by that Office. Petition for rehearing was filed alleging
that such notice had been given and that. no intervening petition
had thereafter been filed, but such petition was denied. The
Superior Court of Cook County found that the order of the commission did not contain sufficient findings; that there was no
evidence to support the findings made; that the order was
against the manifest weight of the evidence; that the former
rates which the cancellation would leave in effect were confiscatory; and that the commission had exceeded its powers in
making the order.
The commission took the matter to the Illinois Supreme
Court. That court found that the Emergency Price Control Act
of 1942, as amended, did not justify the commission's order
because the amendment of October 2, 1942, requiring notice
was not retroactive, particularly so where the hearings before
the commission had been concluded prior to the effective date
of the amendment. The failure to give notice was said not to
affect a jurisdiction which had been lawfully acquired. Criticism
was also directed to the commission for not having intimated,
75 390 Il1.

40, 60 N. E. (2d) 232 (1945).
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prior to the entry of its order, that the question of compliance
with the Price Control Act was under consideration as well for
failure to make findings of fact either for or against the reasonableness of the proposed rates. No evidence was presented bebefore the commission on the point of whether or not notice had
been given to the Office of Price Administration. If the commission had decided that relatively simple question with reasonable dispatch, its order as to the reasonableness of the rates
would have been filed before the date of the amendment of the
Price Control Act. It was held that the commission had not performed its statutory duty, to-wit: to determine the reasonableness of the new rates, but had instead held them invalid upon a
ground it lacked authority to consider. Facts conceivably known
to the commission but not placed in evidence were no basis on
which to support an order. 76 The court also pointed out that
a hearing before the commission is "not a partisan hearing
with the commission on one side arrayed against the utility on
the other, but .
it is, instead, an administrative investigation instituted for the purpose of ascertaining and making findings of fact." 77
The mere fact that rates on electric current were lowered to
meet competition was held insufficient, in Wedron Silica Company v. Illinois Commerce Commission,7 to prove that a utility
had been charging an excessive rate. A complaint had been
made by a customer of the utility on the ground that it had
charged a discriminatory rate. After hearing, the commission
dismissed the complaint for lack of proof. The circuit court
set aside the commission's order. An appeal followed. Electric
current was sold by the utility under several different schedules
of rates for industrial users in different localities. The rate
charged the complainant applied without regard to territorial
restrictions although lower rates were available in restricted
communities to meet competition from another utility operating
in these areas. It appeared from the evidence that the com76 The court cited Rockwell Lime Co. v. Commerce Commission, 373 Ill. 309, 26
N. E. (2d) 99 (1940).
77390 Il1. 40 at 46, 60 N. E. (2d) 232 at 235.
78 387 Il1. 581, 57 N. E. (2d) 349 (1944).

82

UHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

plainant was not located in any one of the restricted areas and
the commission found that reducing all rates to the same level
as those charged in the areas of competition would result in
serious loss. It concluded that no unjust discrimination existed
in the absence of evidence tending to show that the cost of producing and delivering energy in the two areas was the same or
that they disclosed comparable conditions. That view was upheld on the ground that unjust discrimination is not proved by
a mere comparison of rates fixed in different schedules without
evidence showing the conditions to be the same in both areas.
In St. Clair Housing Authority v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company,79 the court faced a question as to whether or
not a city could grant a franchise to a public utility giving it an
interest in streets and alleys which would last beyond the time
the streets and alleys were used by the public. The housing
authority there concerned, through purchase and eminent domain, had acquired title to land abutting on certain streets and
alleys along which the defendant maintained poles and wires
pursuant to franchises granted it. Some of these streets and
alleys were vacated by the city at the request of the housing
authority. Defendant refused to remove its property from such
vacated streets so plaintiff instituted suit. The lower court found
for the defendant on its claim that the franchise ordinance had
vested it with a perpetual easement. Direct appeal was taken
to the Supreme Court on the principle that a perpetual easement acquired by grant constitutes a freehold.
The ordinances under which the defendant operated contained
no provision as to the duration of the grant but the conditions
imposed required free telephone service for certain city offices.
It was stipulated that the ordinances were still in force and effect
and that defendant provided the free telephone service. Plaintiff had acquired whatever title it had to the former streets and
alleys by ownership of the lots abutting thereon and also by the
ordinance vacating them which contained the words "subject
to all present legal rights, if any, of any public utility companies
79387 Il. 180, 56 N. E. (2d) 357 (1944),

noted in 39 Il1. L. Rev. 427.
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therein and thereto." Plaintiff contended that the vacation by
the city was an exercise of the police power and that the council
had no right to grant a franchise which would restrict later
exercise of such police power in the interests of society and the
public.
The Supreme Court reversed a finding for defendant and remanded the case with directions to grant leave to either party
to make the city a party to the proceeding, holding the city to
be a necessary party even though that point had not been raised
by the litigants. While not passing on the merits of the case,
the opinion points out that where streets and alleys come into
public use through a common-law dedication, title remains in
the abutting property owners subject to the easement of the
public,8 0 whereas if they come into public use by the city's acceptance of a statutory dedication of the plat, then the city's
title is that of a base or determinable fee, subject to being defeated whenever public use ceases." This creates a doubt either
as to the city's ability to execute a franchise outlasting its vacation of the streets, or as to the city's ability to vacate after it
has once executed such a franchise. After the city has been
made a party, the case will presumably be brought before the
court again on review for a clarification of these points and a
resolution of the doubts.
Plenary and exclusive jurisdiction over railroad grade crossings, in the -exercise of the police power, is vested in the Illinois
Commerce Commission according to the holding in Illinois
Central Railroad Company v. Franklin County.s2 That case
also clarifies an apparent conflict in statutory provisions on the
subject. The railroad there concerned filed a petition before the
commission to require Franklin County and others to renew and
improve, or in the alternative, to abandon two overhead highway bridges over the company's tracks in that county. The
commission found that the volume of traffic and other conditions did not warrant a renewal of one of the bridges but did
so Sullivan v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 251 Ill. 108, 95 N. E. 1081 (1911).
s8Prall v. Burckhartt, 299 Ill.19, 132 N. E. 280 (1921).
s2387 IlL. 301, 56 N. E. (2d) 775 (1944).
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as to the other. The cost of such renewal was apportioned
equally between the railroad and the county. On rehearing, a
re-apportionment of cost was ordered and the railroad was directed to pay sixty per cent. thereof. The circuit court set aside
the order of the commission, and the railroad appealed.
The only question was as to the lawfulness and reasonableness of the order for apportionment. The railroad contended
this was a valid exercise of the police power while the county
claimed it was invalid for want of power in the commission by
reason of language in Section 58 of the Public Utilities Act S
and also because of a provision in the statute relating to fencing
8 4
and operation of railroads.
Section 58, when enacted in 1913, provided in its first paragraph that no public highway should be constructed across a
railroad without permission from the commission but subject to
the proviso that "this section shall not apply to the replaceThe
ment of lawfully existing roads, highways and tracks."
second paragraph thereof directed that grade separations and
crossings could be required with power in the commission to
apportion the cost of such. In 1917, that section was amended
to give the commission power to require reconstruction and
improvements of crossings as well as to apportion the cost.
The county claimed that the proviso in the original act carried over into the amended act and withheld from the commission
all power over existing highway crossings over railroads. and
replacements of crossings over existing tracks. The Supreme
Court disagreed with that contention and held that the proviso
only meant that permission of the commission was not required
for replacement of lawfully existing crossings and did not affect
its power to apportion the cost.
Section 8 of the act in relation to fencing and operating railroads merely restated the duty imposed on the railroads by common law, requiring them to construct and maintain highway
crossings on their rights of way. Being enacted in 1874, it was
83
84
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superseded by the later Public Utilities Act. As the acts are
so inconsistent that both cannot operate, the repugnant provisions of the earlier statute had to yield to the provisions of the
later one dealing with the same subject matter. Language in
Henderson County v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
Company, 5 which may indicate that the duty of a railroad is
not modified by the Public Utilities Act, is not to be followed.
As the commission had been given clear power to do what it did,
and as the proviso that the costs of apportionment shall include
certain costs does not restrict the power to apportion to the
items enumerated but enlarges the general expression of what
costs may be so apportioned, the order of the commission was
upheld.
TAXATION

By its decision in the second Barnett case, 6 the Illinois Supreme Court has again invalidated a statute attempting to provide for "pre-adjudication" of tax levies in Cook County. 7
As in the two preceding cases,8 8 the ground for invalidation was
the denial of due process, i.e., that taxpayers would be precluded
by the proceedings without having received adequate notice
thereof. The present statute was the fourth attempt 89 of the
legislature to meet this very important problem; each successive
statute being designed to obviate specific defects found to justify prior invalidations. The principal feature of the instant
statute was a requirement for the mailing of notice, at least
fifteen days before the return date, to the "taxpayers in the
territorial limits of the municipal corporation, quasi municipal
corporation or taxing body whose annual levies are being ad85 320 Ill. 608, 151 N. E. 542 (1926).
88 Barnett v. County of Cook, 388 Il1. 251, 57 N. E. (2d) 873 (1944), noted in 39
Ill. L. Rev. 407.
87 Laws 1943, Vol. 1, p. 1103; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120, §§ 831-41.
88 Griffin v. County of Cook, 369 I1. 380, 16 N. E. (2d) 906, 118 A. L. R. 1157
(1938),

invalidating Laws 1937, p. 1019, noted in

18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVE W

66, 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 326; Barnett v. County of Cook, 373 Ill. 516, 26 N. E.
(2d) 862 (1940), declaring Laws 1939, p. 848, unconstitutional, noted In 19
CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvIEw 82.

88 A third statute, S. B. 198 (1941), had been vetoed by the Governor upon an
opinion of invalidity furnished by the Attorney-General.
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justed." 90 The Supreme Court found a number of faults with
the adequacy of such notice, but the gist of them was that it was
practically impossible to make up a list of current taxpayers and
their addresses. The position taken would seem to indicate that
further attempts to secure "pre-adjudication" would be futile.
Schreiber v. County of Cook,9 1 however, sustained the validity
of the so-called "Scavenger Act," which requires the county
collector to offer for sale for unpaid taxes all property upon
which a part or all of the general taxes for each of ten or more
years are delinquent.9 2 Provision is made therein for the inclusion of delinquent special assessments upon written request
of taxing districts levying the same. The property may be sold
for less than the full amount due and, upon confirmation, the
sale extinguishes the lien of all general taxes, special taxes
and special assessments for which judgment has been entered
as well as all forfeitures therefor. The state or any taxing district may bid at the sale, and if the county acquires the property it is to hold the same as trustee for all taxing district interested, including the state. The statute also provides that redemption from sale does not revive the lien or forfeiture.
Various objections to the constitutionality of the act were
urged but all were overruled. To the claim that the applicability
thereof only to property on which taxes were in default for ten
years involved an arbitrary classification, the court replied that
classification based on a time period is reasonable. To the contention that the effect of the act was to destroy the equality of
taxation required by the Illinois Constitution, 93 the court noted
that absolute equality is impracticable so that incidental inequalities do not invalidate. 4 The argument that the act con90 Laws 1943, Vol. 1, p. 1105; Ill.Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120, § 834.

91388 Ill. 297, 58 N. E. (2d) 40, 155 A. L. R. 1162 (1944).
92 Laws 1943, Vol. 1, p. 1075; I1. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120, § 716a.
93 11. Const. 1870, Art IX, § 1: ". . . so that every person and corporation shall
pay a tax In proportion to the value of his, her or its property. ...."
94 The court said, 388 I1. 297 at 303, 58 N. E. (2d) 40 at 43, that: "Inequalities
that result occasionally and incidentally in the application of a system that is
not arbitrary In Its classification and not applied in a hostile and discriminatory
manner, are not sufficient to defeat the tax."
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travened Section 6 of Article IX of the Constitution 5 was refuted on the ground that such section has application only to a
release of all state taxes for an entire taxing unit.96 An alleged
violation of Section 22 of Article IV, 97 brought about by subordinating the lien of general taxes to the lien of special assessments, was overcome by indicating that such section applies only
to private corporations.9
Criticism that the provision for selling for less than the total amount due on unpaid special assessments impaired the obligation of a contract, 99 that is the contract of the assessment bonds, was answered when the court said
that the fatal weakness in that argument lay in the fact that the
judgment of confirmation of an assessment in a local improvement proceeding, on which the delinquency judgment was to be
predicated, was not a contract.'
Two "inclusion-exclusion" cases concerning the operation of
office buildings and the like may be worthy of brief mention. In
Liberty National Bank of Chicago v. Collins, 2 the Supreme Court
held that the owner of a building who, under lease agreements,
furnished electricity to the tenants of the premises, is engaged
in the business of selling electricity for use and consumption
within the provisions of the Public Utilities Revenue Act of
1937, 3 hence liable to pay the tax thereby imposed. It should
be noted that the owner of the building was there actually
"billing" tenants for electricity and not merely furnishing the
same as an incidental service. In Theo. B. Robertson Products
Company v. Nudelman,4 however, the court held that where sales
of paper products, soap and the like, are made to hotels, office
95 That section directs: "The general assembly shall have no power to release
or discharge any county, city, township, town or district whatever, or the inhabitants thereof, or the property therein, from their or its proportionate share
of taxes to be levied for state purposes, nor shall commutation for such taxes be
authorized in any form whatever."
96 Raymond v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 196 Ill. 329, 63 N. E. 745 (1902).
97 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 22, denies to the general assembly the power to
pass local or special laws in certain enumerated instances.
98 See People v. Green, 382 Ill. 577, 47 N. E. (2d) 465 (1943).
99 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 14.
1 388 Ill. 297 at 309, 58 N. E. (2d) 40 at 46, citing Hoehamer v. Village of Elmwood Park, 361 Ill. 422, 198 N. E. 345, 102 A. L. R. 196 (1935).
2 388 Ill. 549, 58 N. E. (2d) 610 (1945).
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 120, § 468 et seq.
4 389 Ill. 281, 59 N. E. (2d) 655 (1945).
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buildings and other buildings, who furnish such products as a
part of the service rendered to patrons and tenants either without compensation or as a part of the service paid for by the
user, then such hotels or buildings are the users or consumers
of the articles so that the seller is in the business of selling
tangible personal property at retail within the meaning of the
5
Retailers Occupation Tax Act.
Brief mention should also be made of two Illinois Supreme
Court cases dealing with inheritance taxes. In re Estate of
Johnson6 declares that property passing under a will but pursuant to a contractual undertaking on the part of the testator
is not subject to inheritance tax, even though the contract is not
to bequeath a specific sum of money or property of a designated
value but rather is to devise an aliquot share. The court had
some difficulty in distinguishing apparently contrary decisions,
such as that in the case of In re Gould's Estate.7 It would seem
that the instant decision may encourage the employment of similar devices in the future as a means of "minimizing" inheritance taxes. If so, the court may be called upon to limit somewhat the seemingly broad doctrine laid down therein.
In re Estate of Harding8 raises an interesting point with respect to the right to obtain a reassessment of inheritance taxes
under Section 25 of the statute.9 Property there had been left
in specified shares to the widow and three children, with provision that should any child predecease the widow his share
should go to his wife and children. The county court had apparently assessed the original tax on the assumption that the three
children took vested interests. One child did predecease the
widow, leaving him surviving a widow and three children, with
an aggregate exemption of $100,000. Had reassessment been
permitted, a substantial refund would have been in order. Petitioner alleged that the original assessment had been made under
5 Il1.
6389
7 156
838S
9 11.

Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 120, § 440 et seq.
Ill. 425, 59 N. E. (2d) 825 (1945).
N. Y. 423, 51 N. E. 287 (1898).
Il1. 598, 58 N. E. (2d) 524 (1945).
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120, § 398.
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Section 25, but this the respondent denied. The court held that
the original assessment had not been made on a "contingent"
basis so the reassessment provision was not available. It would
seem clear that the interests of the three children, even though
vested, were subject to being divested so that a contingency was
involved within the intendment of the statute. Some language
in the opinion might be inferred to support the view that the
holding would have been otherwise had the order of the county
court definitely stated that the assessment had been made pursuant to Section 25.10
Although questions arising under the Unemployment Compensation Act" do not technically belong in the field of taxation, a
practice previously established of treating such matters with
taxation cases will be followed. Inasmuch as the act does not
depend upon the common-law concept of employer and employee, 12 it is not surprising that there have been a number of
decisions pricking out the line between employee and independent contractor under the act.
Fuel-oil "haulers," being managers of small corporations or
associations with several employees operating trucks for hauling oil, paying their own expenses and the wages of employees,
employed principally in hauling products of an oil company for
a fixed compensation per gallon, but available to haul for other
concerns a part of the time, although using the oil company's
garage and having no other address than that of the oil company, were said not to be employees in Arrow Petroleum Company v. Murphy.13 The same case also declared that fuel-oil
"peddlers," or dealers in coal, ice and fuel, each of whom owned
their own trucks, one of which was used to haul fuel-oil purchased from the oil company and sold at his fixed price to customers found by him, the oil being charged to him by the oil
to That section was amended by Laws 1945, p. 1239, S. B. 415; Il1. Rev. Stat.
1945, Ch. 120, § 398. As amended, the section is susceptible of an interpretation
allowing the relief here sought.
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 48, § 217 et seq.
12 Rozran v. Durkin, 381 Ill. 97, 45 N. E. (2d) 180 (1942); A. George Miller,
Inc. v. Murphy, 379 Ill. 524, 42 N. E. (2d) 78 (1942).
13 389 Ill. 43, 58 N. E. (2d) 532 (1945).
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company at their retail price and an agreed difference being
paid to him as a commission, were not within the scope of the act.
In another case, that of Beth Weber, Inc., v. Murphy,1 4 a dressmaker who had space on the balcony of a dress shop, made
alterations for the shop at her own prices, the cost being added
to the price of the dress sold. She kept her own accounts, paid
her own assistants, and was in turn paid weekly on presenting
bills to the shop. It was said that she was not an "employee"
because she also held herself out as a fitter for others, did work
for her own customers in the same place, and the owner of the
shop was interested only in the "result" of the work being done.
In several other cases, however, persons, almost equally as independent were classified as employees within the contemplation of the act. Thus, in Murphy v. Daumit,15 a vacuum cleaner
salesman, most of whose sales were made on time contracts and
"trade-ins" subject to approval of the distributor, the title to
the machines remaining in the distributor until transferred to
the vendees, was said to be an employee even though the salesman, when taking a machine, signed a receipt reciting its purchase by him subject to the distributor's lien. In another case, 16
certain motorcycle drivers were engaged exclusively in picking
up and delivering packages for the operator of a package-delivery service. The latter procured the business, gave telephone
directions to the drivers, cleared all packages through his office,
and billed customers for all services rendered. The drivers were
paid a portion of the fees billed but were, nevertheless, classed
as employees.
Fuel-oil "solicitors," employed by a related business which
enabled them to sell fuel-oil, but also operating under an arrangement with an oil company to sell on commission to such
customers as they might obtain, orders being subject to acceptance or rejection and the solicitors being subject to discharge
if their efforts were not satisfactory, were likewise denominated
11. 60, 58 N. E. (2d) 913 (1945).
15 387 11. 406, 56 N. E. (2d) 800 (1944). Wilson, J., dissented.
16 Zelney v. Murphy, 387 IIl. 492, 56 N. E. (2d) 754 (1944), noted in 33 I1.
B. J. 169.
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"employees.' 7 Photographers' models, if not free from the
direction and control of the photographer in the performance of
their services, provided their services are not rendered outside
the usual course of the business, are also "employees". 8 For
that matter, a so-called "distributor" of cosmetics, extracts and
similar products supplied by a manufacturer to be sold by
canvassers under the direction of the distributor, the manufacturer retaining title to the merchandise until sold, accepting daily
remittances for sales made, prescribing the methods of sale, and
having the right to discharge the distributor when his sales no
longer warranted maintaining the branch outlet, was also treated
as an "employee" in Van Ogden, Inc. v. Murphy.19
Several other cases involving problems of liability under the
20
act should be mentioned at least briefly. In Crouch v. Murphy,
it was held that one who incidentally assists as an occasional
accommodation and wholly without remuneration in any form
is not an employee. The court rejected the argument that since
an employee who receives less than the statutory minimum for
eligibility to benefits under the act may nevertheless be considered a sixth employee for the benefit of the other five, although
himself not entitled to benefits, 2 1 so a person performing some
service even though he receives no compensation whatever
should be considered a sixth employee for the benefit of the
other five.
In Grant Contracting Company v. Murphy, 2 the court held
that members of a dredging crew were not excluded from the
benefits of the act by reason of Section 2(f) (6) (c) 23 which denies benefits to those whose service is performed "as an officer
or member of the crew of a vessel on the navigable waters of the
United States." The men in question were employed on barges
Arrow Petroleum Co. v. Murphy, 389 Ill. 43, 58 N. E. (2d) 532 (1945).
Photographic Illus., Inc. v. Murphy, 389 Ill. 334, 59 N. E. (2d) 681 (1945),
Wilson, J., dissented. The case involves substantially the same situation and
holding as in A. George Miller, Inc. v. Murphy, 379 Ill. 524, 42 N. E. (2d) 78
17
18

(1942).

19390 Il. 133, 60 N. E. (2d) 877 (1945).
20

21

390 Ill. 112, 60 N. E. (2d) 879 (1945).
Smith v. Murphy, 384 Ill. 34, 50 N. E. (2d) 844 (1943).

12387 Ill.
137, 56 N. E. (2d) 313 (1944).
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, §218.

23
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engaged in deepening the channel of the Illinois River,
movement of the barges was merely incidental to such
Although the laborers and the "bosses" were given
titles, they were engaged primarily in excavation, lived
each night, had no seamen's licenses and performed no
ordinarily identified with navigation.

and the
purpose.
nautical
at home
services

An unincorporated association of grain trimmers was not an
"employing unit" under the act according to Chicago Grain
Trimmers Association v. Murphy,24 hence it was not liable for
assessments made by the Director of Labor. It was found that
the association had no source of income except that derived from
its members' labor, was not in business for the purpose of earning profits upon capital contributed by its members, and that
its only purpose was to provide a practical means of disposing
of the services of its members in the loading and unloading of
grain to and from ships.
The court in Panther Creek Mines, Inc. v. Murphy 25 held that
the word "wages" as used in the act 26 is not so inclusive as the
27
term 'earnings" as used in the Workmen's Compensation Act,
but is instead restricted to remuneration received from "perThat case involved "contract miners" of coal
sonal service."
who were paid a certain price per ton against which they were
charged for powder, caps, and fuses furnished by the employer
as well as for blacksmith services. The court held that the employer was not required to make contribution on the amounts so
charged and deducted. In a similar factual situation arising
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the court had held
that such charges and deductions were to be disregarded and the
gross compensation was to be used in computing the compensation allowable to the widow and next of kin. 28 To explain the
seeming inconsistency, the court observed that it had previously
noted that. the "basic objects sought by the two acts were so far
24 389 Il. 102, 58 N. E. (2d) 906 (1945).
25 390 Ill. 23, 60 N. E. (2d) 217 (1945).

16 Il. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 48, § 220.
27 Ibid., Ch. 48, § 144.
28 Springfield Coal Min. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 Ill. 408, 126 N. E.
133 (1920).
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different that decisions construing the Workmen's Compensation Act were of little value as precedents in construing the Unemployment Compensation Act.' '29
The "War Risk" amendments to Section 18 of the act30 were
sustained in S. Buchsbaum & Company v. Gordon ' despite a
claim that they constituted special legislation and denied to
certain employers the equal protection of the law. That section
deals with rates and payment of contributions by employers to
the "fund" provided for under the act. The amendments there
criticized were adopted with a view to compelling war-expanded
activities to bear their equitable share of the burden of the act.
They provided, in substance, for higher rates of contribution
by employers whose 1942 payrolls substantially exceeded their
1940 ones. The court recognized the reasonableness of the
classification and the necessity for correcting inequalities inherent in "experience" assessments in times of economic insta2
bility.8
VIII. TORTS
Cases in the field of torts involve little that is new in the law.
A number, however, apply well-established standards to novel
factual situations so as to warrant some comment. As many of
these cases arise on appeal from directed verdicts or decisions
on motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the entire
factual situation is usually not before the appellate tribunal but
only that aspect of the evidence is presented which is most favorable to the appellant's case. It is necessary, therefore, that no
undue weight be given to any decision as precedent for an entirely different result might have been produced on consideration of the entire record.
n '
There are implications in the decision in Plotkin v. Winkler,
29 See Oak Woods Cemetery Ass'n v. Murphy, 383 i1. 301, 50 N. E. (2d) 582
(1943).
so 111. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, § 234.
31389 Ill. 493, 59 N. E. (2d) 832 (1945).
32 See extract of report transmitted to the governor and general assembly quoted
493 at 496-7, 59 N. E. (2d) 832 at 835.
in 389 Ill.
1323 Ill. App. 181, 55 N. E. (2d) 545 (1944).
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al attractive nuisance case, which should arouse the interest of
landlords owning apartment buildings. The plaintiff there, a
nine-year old child, was injured by falling through an inadequately protected air-shaft on the roof of the building where
she lived. Access to the roof was obtained from a porch, over a
low railing, and up a ladder which had been in place for more
than a year before the accident. Plaintiff, and other children,
bad frequently played on the roof and shouted down the airshaft to produce an echo. There was evidence of knowledge of
this habit on the part of the defendant 2 as well as evidence that
the children never played in the courtyard attached to the
premises because of the presence of parked automobiles located
there. Directed verdict for defendant in the trial court had been
predicated on the ground that (1) an attractive nuisance had to
be something which could be seen from the street, and (2) the
plaintiff, and the other children, were trespassers. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for trial because the
ease with which young children could reach the roof, the absence
of barricades, and the presence of the ladder served as an invitation or even a "challenge" to persons so young. It was also
held that, as there was no playground or other facilities for children residing in the building, the plaintiff was not a trespasser.
Want of visibility of the attractive nuisance from the street
should not be conclusive, as a matter of law, for the plaintiff was
rightfully on a part of the premises from which the attractive
nuisance could be observed. If, by the decision, it becomes the
duty of the landlord to furnish playground space for the children
of his tenants, the picture i entirely changed for recourse to the
doctrine of attractive nuisance would become unnecessary. The
plaintiff would then be an invitee, entitled to the well-recognized
affirmative duty to make the premises safe for his tenants. In
another landlord case, that of Hart v. Sullivan,3 the lessor was
2 The action also ran against a bank which held title to the property in trust
but which had leased the premises to the other defendant. Directed verdict in
favor of the bank was sustained on the ground that, In the absence of contract, the
lessee or occupant is responsible for failure to keep the premises in repair:
Marcovitz v. Hergenrether, 302 Ill. 162, 134 N. E. 85 (1922), and cases there
cited.
3324 Ill. App. 243, 58 N. E. (2d) 301 (1944), noted In 40 Ill. L. Rev. 142.
O'Connor, J., wrote a specially concurring opinion.
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held not responsible for the death of a person who fell on unlighted stairs because it was not shown that he was an invitee of
the tenant and furthermore was guilty of contributory negligence
in going along an unlighted passage while totally unfamiliar with
the premises.
Railroad crossing cases appear to manifest an increasing tendency on the part of courts to take the case from the jury and decide the issues as a matter of law. By so doing, they tend to
stress the duty of the public to recognize the right of the railroad
to facilitate rapid operation of its trains in the interest of modern
economic conditions. For example, the question of wanton and
wilful conduct, usually a matter of fact, was treated as a matter
4
of law in Robertson v. New York Central Railroad Company.
The plaintiff in that case was intending to drive across tracks in
a sparsely settled village over a familiar route. He was operating at moderate speed, but saw no train nor heard any warning
signal. View along the track was not obstructed any more than
is normally the case. The jury found both general negligence
and also wanton conduct in (a) the rate of speed, (b) the absence of warning, and (c) the failure to keep a look-out for persons using the intersection. Judgment on the general negligence
count was reversed by the Appellate Court because of contributory negligence, but judgment on the wanton conduct was
affirmed. On leave to appeal, the Supreme Court reversed on the
ground that there was no evidence in the record to justify submitting the charge of wantonness to the jury. It said that neither
the absence of warning nor the rate of speed, bearing in mind the
surrounding territory, could constitute wilful and wanton negligence and that the engineer was entitled to assume that the
driver would refrain from putting himself in a place of danger
and consequently was not obliged to stop the train until it became
apparent that the plaintiff was not doing so.5 The court seemed
to treat the absence of warning as a matter of simple negligence.
If railroads are to be permitted higher rates of speed in the in4 388 Ill. 580, 58 N. E. (2d) 527 (1945), reversing 321 Ill. App. 313, 53 N. E.
(2d) 144 (1944).
5 Morgan v. New York Cent, R. Co., 327 Il1. 339, 158 N. E. 724 (1927).
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terest of prompt and efficient service, it would seem that they
should be held more rigidly to the requirement of giving timely
warning to travelers on the highway.
The case of Berg v. New York Central Railroad Company"
also involved a question of railroad speed although the principal
issue was one of "cause" or "condition."
The plaintiff there
was a passenger in a car struck by defendant's train. The highway leading to the crossing was icy and slippery, a fact known
or which should have been known to all concerned. Visibility
seemed to be poor and there was evidence of a negative character
that no warning was given. The driver sought to stop when the
train came into view, found himself skidding, and proceeded to
"gun" the car across the tracks. Verdict for plaintiff was converted into a judgment in his favor by the trial court despite defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. That
judgment was reversed when the Appellate Court, although finding for plaintiff on the issue of contributory negligence, imputed
or otherwise, concluded that the icy condition of the highway,
rather than defendant's carelessness, was the proximate cause
of plaintiff's injury.
On the question of proximate cause, the court commented upon
what would appear to be confficting lines of authority from outside sources 7 as to whether the jury should be permitted to inquire into the question as to whether or not the driver would have
stopped or have attempted to stop had the requisite signal been
given. Denial of the right has been said to rest upon the fact that
it would allow the jury to enter the field of speculation and adventure. The only Illinois case on somewhat similar facts8 seems
to turn upon contributory negligence because the plaintiff there
was operating a car with defective brakes, while the instant case
specifically discloses the absence of contributory negligence.
6 323 Il. App. 221, 55 N. E. (2d) 394 (1944).
The decision therein was reviewed on certificate of importance and affirmed in 391 11. 52, 62 N. E. (2d) 676
(1945), not in the period of this survey.
7 Compare Barrett v. United States Railroad Administration, 196 Iowa 1143, 194
N. W. 222 (1923), with Miller v. Union Pacific R. Co., 290 U. S. 227, 54 S. Ct. 172,
78 L. Ed. 285 (1933).
s Moudy v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 385 IlI. 446, 53 N. E. (2d) 406 (1944).
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Nevertheless, the court denied recovery even though the general
condition was known to, or should have been known by, defendant. It does not appear that it would be necessary for the
jury to enter into the field of "speculation and adventure" to
decide that, if timely warning were given by defendant, the
driver, as a reasonable person, would have applied the brakes
and stopped in time to avert collision. It is unfortunate, therefore, to say that the icy street, rather than defendant's neglect,
was the cause of the injury instead of a mere condition.
In Elliott v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Company,9 the
Illinois Appellate Court found contributory negligence as a matter of law in the driver's failure to stop, look and listen at a
railroad crossing even though the warning signal, of the bell-andflasher type, was not operating. A directly contrary result was
attained in Surdyk v. Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company0
where the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground
that the case should have gone to the jury. In that case the railroad maintained crossing gates and there was conflict of evidence as to whether the same were lowered. The Elliott case is
not, supported by the authorities therein cited for, with one exception, 1 ' they are cases where no warning device other than the
ordinary wooden "railroad crossing" sign was involved. The
Surdyk case, on the other hand, is fully supported by the authorities 12 and probably represents the true state of the present Illinois law on the subject. The Elliott case approaches perilously
to the point of depriving the plaintiff of trial by jury.
Automobile cases have raised interesting questions.' 3 In Budds
9325 Ill. App. 161, 59 N. E. (2d) 486 (1945). Kiley, J., wrote a specially concurring opinion. Leave to appeal has been denied.
10148 F. (2d) 795 (1945).
11 The cited case of Briske v. Village of Burnham, 379 Ill. 193, 39 N. E. (2d)
976 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGo-KENT LAw RnviEw 92, dealt with an obstruction
in a street which consisted of a permanent barricade painted in alternate stripes
and bearing a red reflector.
12 Humbert v. Lowden, 385 Ill. 437, 53 N. E. (2d) 418 (1944) ; Chicago & E. I.
R. Co. v. Schmitz, 211 Ill. 446, 71 N. E. 1050 (1904); Chicago & A. R. Co. v.
Pearson, 184 Ill. 386, 56 N. E. 633 (1900) ; Greenfield v. Terminal t Ass'n of St.
Louis, 289 Ill. App. 147, 6 N. E. (2d) 888 (1937) ; Oswald v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co., 283 Ill. App. 86 (1936).
13The decision in Palmer v. Miller 323 Ill. App. 528, 56 N. E. (2d) 447 (1944),
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v. Keeshin Motor Express Company, Inc.,14 the court, refusing
to disturb the verdict of the jury, reiterated the principles that
the law does not charge one with the duty of anticipating dangers
but permits him to assume that others have performed their duty
to give proper warning of hidden dangers ;15 that persons forced
to act in sudden emergencies are not to be judged by hindsight ;18
and that a person without fault, confronted with sudden danger,
although obliged to exercise ordinary care for his own safety, is
not expected to act with the same deliberation and foresight as
would be expected under ordinary circumstances. 1 7 To much the
same effect is the decision in Roady v. Rhodes.'
It is a familiar practice for city bus drivers, when blocked from
regularly established stopping places, to stop at a point to the
rear thereof and usually distant from the curb to permit passengers to board or alight. That practice was involved in Van
Hoorebecke v. Iowa Illinois Gas & Electric Company 9 where
plaintiff, after completing part of her journey, waited to transfer
to another bus. The second bus was unable to get to the curb
and there was some evidence that the driver motioned the awaiting passengers, including plaintiff, to board well back of the
regular place. The street was slippery and plaintiff fell as she
moved forward. The trial court granted judgment notwithstanding a verdict for the plaintiff. That decision was reversed and a
new trial ordered on the ground that plaintiff, when she started
toward the bus under the conditions shown with intent to board
it and as a part of a continuous journey, was a passenger and entitled to the protection afforded to such persons.2 0 Defendant's
reliance on Davis v. South Side Elevated Railroad Company 21
to show that its duty was merely to provide reasonably safe
an extension of the earlier decision in 380 Ill. 256, 43 N. E. (2d) 973 (1942), noted
ante p. 45, discusses the liability of a minor for failure to control the conduct of a
companion placed in charge of the minor's car.
14326 Ill. App. 59, 61 N. E. (2d) 579 (1945).
15 Pollard v. Broadway Central Hotel Corp., 353 Ill. 312, 187 N. E. 487 (1933).
16 Barnes v. Danville St. Ry. & Light Co., 235 Ill. 566, 85 N. E. 921 (1908).
17 Synwolt v. Klauk, 296 Ill. App. 79, 15 N. E. (2d) 895 (1938).
18326 Ill. App. 49, 61 N. E. (2d) 584 (1945).
19324 Ill. App. 88, 57 N. E. (2d) 652 (1944).
20 Feldman v. Chicago Rys. Co., 289 Ill. 25, 124 N. E. 334 (1919).
21292 Ill. 378, 127 N. E. 66, 10 A. L. R. 254 (1920).
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depots, platforms and approaches, rather than to exercise the
highest degree of care, was declared to be unsound. The higher
degree of care required when passengers are boarding or alighting from the carrier's vehicles was said to rest on the fact that
the danger is as great as if the passengers were on moving equipment.
Again there was argument over the question of proximate
cause, the defendant contending that it was the slippery condition of the sidewalk and not the action of the defendant's driver
which produced the injury. On this point, the court held that as
the slippery condition existed before the bus drove up, the stopping thereof and the invitation to board were subsequent independent acts which, if proved, rendered the contention of the defendant inapplicable.
The opinion of the Appellate Court in Johnson v. Stevens
Building Catering Company 22 contains a criticism of the language in some earlier Illinois cases on the subject of res ipsa loquitur. With regard thereto, the court said:
While it has been said in some Illinois cases that the presumption of negligence raised by the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not absolute or conclusive but
is rebuttable and vanishes when any evidence appears to the
contrary, it seems to us that where the doctrine is applicable
the use of the term "presumption of negligence" is an inapt
and unfortunate characterization of the prima facie case
made out by the fact of the injury itself and the circumstances attending it. Of course such a prima facie case is
neither absolute nor conclusive but to say that it "vanishes
entirely when any evidence appears to the contrary" is
equivalent to holding that regardless of how flimsy the explanation offered by a defendant may be as to its exercise of
due care in connection with the instrumentality that caused
the injury and regardless of the incredibility and improbability of the explanation, such explanation must be accepted
as true. If that were the correct rule a plaintiff could never
22

323 I1. App. 212, 55 N. E. (2d) 550 (1944).
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recover under the principle of res ipsa loquitur, if a defendant offered any evidence by way of explanation of due
care on his part, no matter how incredible and improbable
such evidence might be. A prima facie case cannot vanish
but must be submitted to the jury with the evidence presented by defendant. It is the province of the jury to determine as a question of fact whether the evidence introduced by a defendant in explanation of the occurrence is
consistent with due care on his part and also to determine the
28
credibility and probability of such evidence.
Such an unusually clear and lucid expression of a concept which
is not new is rarely found for the doctrine has been clouded by
loose and inconclusive language as to "presumptive negligence."
The criticism is most apt and is well-warranted.
Although not strictly a matter of tort law, the recent amendment to the Motor Vehicle Act, 2 4 effective January 1, 1946, may
have some bearing on the likelihood of the person injured in an
automobile accident receiving satisfaction for any judgment he
may be able to obtain. By that amendment, the operator of a
motor vehicle involved in an accident, where the damage to the
property of any one person exceeds $50.00, must make prompt report thereof and display evidence of financial responsibility. If
he cannot, he is faced with suspension of his driving license.
Should security be deposited to prevent forfeiture of driving
privileges, the same is made available only to the payment of any
judgment which may be rendered arising out of the accident.

23 323 Il1.
24

App. 212 at 218-9, 55 N. E. (2d) 550 at 553.
Laws 1945, p. 1078, S. B. 492; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Cb. 95J, §§ 581-58n.

